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Foreword  
 
 These papers represent the culmination of my learning in the domains laid out in my Area of 
Concentration: refugees, narrative, and ethics. They also represent the trajectory of my personal 
development during my time as an MES candidate. 
 The themes they deal with are a radical departure from the journey I intended to embark on two 
years ago. They have been extraordinarily difficult years of sorrow, discovery and growth, and the 
abandonment of my initial Plan of Study directly reflects what has been... bothering me. 
 The heartbreak – as an adult this time – of understanding the nature and extent of the current 
global crisis – environmental, political, cultural, social, spiritual – derailed my intention to study theatre 
and second language acquisition. Yet I stayed squarely focused on refugee issues. 
 
 As people tend to do when they state biographical information, I have already misrepresented 
myself – even in this foreword! These papers do not represent either the depth or the scope of my learning. 
There is much that is absent from them: 
 My personal engagement with theory is largely invisible. Feminist thinking around autobiography, 
which frames how I understand narrative; phenomenological and ecological thinking around the notion of 
embodiment; as well as antiracist, antioppression epistemology and imaginings of a radically different 
world, are all only tacitly implied by these papers. 
 My practical and rigorous study of refugee issues is largely invisible. From the intensive course on 
displacement and policy at Osgoode Law School to fitting that knowledge into global political economy; 
why I understand the issues as structural is not addressed in this work. 
 Finally, the fact that I am a flaming pinko commie could only be apprehended by the carefullest of 
readers. Radical praxis methodologies deeply informed the theatre project I participated in at the Canadian 
Centre for Victims of Torture throughout last year. That, and the fact that I place my heart and body on the 
line in the struggle for a world without borders, without this neanderthal concept of the nation-state, are all 
only silent companions to these pieces. 
 My intimate relationship with Levinas, however, I believe shines in them.  
 
 I offer these pieces to the public – I will submit all of them to various journals – in three different 
voices. The first two, I believe can help make Toronto a better place for refugees to land. The third is my 
formal admission that I am a writer before any other identity. 
 
 I would like also to thank Cate Sandilands, Mora Campbell, and Asher Horowitz, those three 
teachers who administer to three parts of my consciousness, in three registers, for three reasons. They are 
each a pedagogic gift to this world, and this lovely and imperfect institution is blessed indeed to count them 
among its own.     
 
*All visual artwork and poetry are by myself, unless otherwise noted. 
*This package includes a musical CD, which of course is not submitted for academic consideration, but as       an 
enjoyable supplement. 
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Abstract 
 
 This major paper is divided into three sections, which represent three approaches to one 
constellation of ideas: settlement services for refugees, narrative, and ethics. They are also three dimensions 
of one project: the preservation of the alterity of the other.  
 
 Section One is a more formal academic essay outlining what the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas 
has to offer this project vis -à-vis settlement services in general. It does so by contrasting his ethics with the 
two main ethics that presently shape and inform settlement services in Toronto: Christianity and Marxism. 
Using Levinas’ formulation of the ‘height and humility’ of the other as a motif, the discussion identifies 
how both these currents of thought over-narrativize and so collapse the alterity of refugees. It analyses how 
the ethical relation shows itself in stark relief in a hosting dynamic, and describes the uncanny position of 
the host/hostage which any member of the settlement community is in by virtue of her or his job. 
Asymmetry of the relation, proximity and incarnation, and politics and responsibility are central themes in 
a consideration of how behaviour toward refugees might differ starting from this new ethical orientation. 
 
 Section Two is a discursive meditation on the use of arts practices with refugees, focusing on the 
notion of storytelling. Thinking around trauma, narrative, testimony, witnessing, autobiography and self-
representation is explored and analysed. Here again, taking the preservation of radical alterity as the central 
project, Levinasian ethics are privileged in a discussion of Saying and the Said, the present/ce of the Same 
in synchronic time versus the diachronic time of the other, and language itself. The pivotal ideas see 
Levinas in dialogue with Jacques Derrida (in particular his analysis of hospitality) and Roger Simon. 
Psychotherapy and nature poetry also make appearances in this consideration of the intersubjective ethical 
relation. 
 
 Section Three, performed in a prose/poetic voice, is an enactment of the type of ‘de-
narrativization’ that the other two papers ultimately call for. Out of active commitment to the notion of 
embodiment, it is my own story of why I am devoted to refugee issues (why I am triggered to feel 
compassion and responsibility toward whom and what I do; the story of my own exile, my own home, my 
hauntedness and dispossession). 
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JUSTICE-TO-BE-DONE: 
 
LEVINAS        AND        REFUGEE        SETTLEMENT        SERVICES 
 
 
For an individual, her knowledge, in the immediate sense (which we call “experience”), is local and partial. But, 
nonetheless, it is neither false nor fantastic if recognized as such. It is more than the raw data of physical reflexes and 
feelings. It is the originating point of knowledge, the door to our social subjectivity. 
The tendency has been to dismiss the notions of subjectivity and experience as outgrowths of bourgeois individualism 
or psychologism. It is mainly Marxist liberationist politics and cultural theories, preoccupied with the problem of 
representation and its relationship with history, class and culture, that have validated connections between social 
experience and a critical epistemology. 
 
The Dark Side of the Nation pp 11-12 
Himani Bannerji 
 
“By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen 
were not made of things which are visible.”  …Abel “obtained witness that he was righteous, god testifying 
of his gifts; and through it he being dead still speaks.” Then there was faithful Abraham, who “went out, 
not knowing where he was going. By faith he sojourned in the land of promise as in a foreign country…” 
Among so many others who “died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them from 
afar off were assured of them,” God has prepared a city for them. While they are rewarded in the end, their 
worldly state of being is described thus: after they embraced the promises of God, they “confessed that they 
were strangers and pilgrims on the earth…those who say such things declare plainly that they seek a 
homeland…now they desire a better, that is, a heavenly country.”  
 
Hebrews 11 
 
And there is in subjectivity’s relationship with the other... a quasi-hagiographic style that wishes to be neither a sermon 
nor the confession of a ‘beautiful soul’. 
 
Otherwise Than Being p 47  
Emmanuel Levinas 
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The Scene  
Things are otherwise than well for the millions and millions of internally and externally displaced 
people all over the world. The current refugee crisis is neither temporary nor random. It is a predictable 
consequence of interrelated political, economic and ecological crises brought about by interested parties. 
What we have come to call economic and cultural globalization is the nexus between neo-imperialism, or, 
the free-market’s unchecked hypercapitalism and nation-states now ensnared in all kinds of oppositions 
because of it.  
The phenomena of guarded borders, immigration controls, and the nation-state itself are relatively 
new, and already increasingly precarious. The sovereignty of states is in decline. The apprehension of this 
generates a fierce desperation, bringing more brutal mechanisms of control. What is also new, however, is 
the fact that every inhabitable inch of the earth is covered in nation-states. There is no choice but to be in 
one of them, a dangerous state of affairs for persecuted people. And everywhere in rich ‘Western’ 
countries, immigration is an election platform built on the paranoid and xenophobic discourse of ‘alienness’ 
and ‘threat’ that refugees represent. Indeed, the West has “a bad conscience after thousands of years of 
glorious Reason, of the triumphant Reason of knowledge” (Uniqueness:  en, 191)1, and there are perhaps 
no people who suffer from its evils more than those who have no physical home.  
Much to my shame, they are recently being turned away from my nation-state, Canada, in startling 
numbers. If lucky enough to get in, refugees are facing a whole new kind of racism, one no longer content 
to construct them as merely parasites, but now as possible terrorists. Hate crimes have increased and 
refugee rights have deteriorated in the backlash after September 11th, 2001. Canada’s acceptance rate of 
58%2 is plummeting, and in December, Canada implemented the barbaric ‘safe third country’ agreement 
with the United States, which states that neither is obligated to accept asylum seekers arriving from the 
other. The problem is the United States’ proclivity for deporting and ‘interning’ people en masse (yes that 
is the new vocabulary). In a move sickeningly reminiscent of Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ (again 
vocabulary that seems to alarm no one), Canada is also starting to intercept people at sea before they reach 
our waters. 
The international regime of universal human rights, that noble response to another ‘solution’ still 
only a few decades ago, is woefully inadequate and unenforceable. Surely there is no need to ‘shock and 
awe’ my gentle readers with any further demonstration of liberalism’s abject failure to protect humans and 
their rights to anything, let alone their rights to asylum. 
Yet and still. In Canada, there is a moderate regime of approving requests for asylum and helping 
refugees to settle in. Our perfunctory observance of some of the laws we agreed to observe in Geneva is, 
tragically, among the most faithful in the world. And only 0.47% of all asylum-seekers in the world make it 
here; 70 000 a year is not a large number. But these 70 000 are more than asylum seekers, they are more 
than citizens. This ‘more’ is the topic of the present discussion, the surplus that escapes any definition of a 
‘citizen’, however formulated. How to live with these 70 000 people as faces rather than numbers is the 
project of that discussion. If that is possible, it is going to take place through an ethical reconsideration of 
our settlement services. 
Upon arrival, people face the registration procedure, especially impersonal and threatening. From 
there, they are pretty much handed over to cities (all settlement money is municipal), handed over to 
communities who provide settlement services: helping refugees to make a claim, providing translation and 
assis tance in filling out the superlatively complicated Personal Information Form, finding shelter, weather-
appropriate clothing, assisting in the search for housing and eventually employment, providing counseling, 
running matching or befriending programmes and support groups.  
Two very schematically identifiable ethics, quite different from one another, tend to more-or-less 
dominate the scene of settlement services in Toronto. Though ‘Christians’ are not a homogeneous group, 
one ethics can basically be associated with the churches in the city, while a very  loosely defined neo-
Marxism guides several practices.  
The current analysis will suggest that despite their strengths, neither of these ethics can 
sufficiently avoid the tendency to narrativize the lives of re fugees and the discourses around how to serve 
                                                
1 abbreviations for titles by Emmanuel Levinas: en = entre nous, T&I = Totality and Infinity, OTB = 
Otherwise than Being, CPP = Collected Philosophical Papers, DF = Difficult Freedom. 
2 All statistics cited in the following paragraphs are from research taken by the USCR and quoted by Katya 
Nasim in The New Internationalist . 
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them. Briefly, narrativization should be taken as that which absorbs the particular into the generalized story 
one has constructed about the world. The role that other people play in it, then, is assigned and determined 
by the shape of the story before they are on the scene. Such a violation of individual and collective dignity 
is standard in the field of refugee issues. Witness the following excerpt from a mainstream, upper-year high 
school textbook currently in use in Ontario: 
 What refugees appreciate most about Canadian life after their  
 arrival is the experience of individual freedom. Often, in the  
 early period after migration, the refugee has to adjust to this  
 newly gained freedom, but it tends to remain the refugee’s main 
 source of satisfaction with life in Canada.3  
 
For a comical appreciation of the assumptions, the objectification and old-time- anthropology tone 
at work in this passage, may I suggest substituting the word ‘penguin’ for the word ‘refugee’? Of course 
neither Christianity nor Marxism is accountable for the pedagogy of our neo-liberal civil society. But it 
would be, in this discussion, part of what they are up against. 
A sketch of these two ethics will tacitly compare them to the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas, 
which will be explored in greater detail. Levinas makes use of phenomenological reduction but transcends 
it as a method, and transcends phenomenology itself, which he shows to be (just another) ontology. What 
he winds up doing is description, description sure to frustrate and disappoint (and, most often, be 
misunderstood by) anyone seeking an ‘application’ or seeking a prescriptive or normative ethics. What he 
is describes is the ethical relation, which is not a ‘metaphysical’ relatio n, or a relation belonging to formal 
logic, but one that is absolutely concrete. 
This relation and its implications for subjectivity, properly understood, offer much before the 
challenge of reducing the narrativization of the lives of refugees and the attendant issues facing all of us.  
 
Christianity 
 The Christian – in particular the Catholic – churches advocate, organize, provide supportive 
programmes and generally welcome. Hosting – being representatives of Canada and of God – is an explicit 
part of a church’s mandate in many cases. For example, the Faithful Companions of Jesus started FCJ 
Hamilton House; Romero House, named after a priest, was started by a former nun, and the wall of The 
Church of the Holy Trinity (Anglican) behind the Eaton Centre has two massive panels hanging in the 
chapel itself, the photograph and text of which can be found in appendix I, attached.  
Invoking just those three names covers a significant percentage of settlement services provided in 
Toronto, and certainly the highest-profile, most vocal advocacy groups. In a way they are also the most 
politically radical, as they receive mainly congregational funding and need not have the fear of offending 
government funders that their secular counterparts often clearly exhibit. In fact, Holy Trinity was the 
nucleus of the Sanctuary Coalition of Southern Ontario, a ‘meta-legal’ project of sheltering deportees. 
Weekly meetings started being held there twelve years ago.  
 The church is compensating for an unresponsive and uncompassionate government, and facing the 
fact that liberalism has reached its limits. (RG, 122)4 The state’s inability to provide a common direction or 
a ‘shared sense of vision’ affects the lexicon: “A few significant words are noticeably absent from the 
liberal vocabulary today, words like sacrifice and commitment.” (RG, 123) (Whether or not sacrifice is 
necessarily predicated on a common meaning for all of society will be one of the themes of this discussion).  
 Obviously, the ethics that guides them in their work – their frontline, day-to-day being with 
refugees (in the case of Romero House, living with refugees) comes from Christian traditions. Mary Jo 
Leddy, the founder of Romero House, says of her community, “As people who have been shaped by the 
biblical tradition, we are called to welcome the stranger as we would welcome God in our midst.” (BCH, 
276) It is impossible to miss the injunction to treat the stranger with kindness in the ‘old testament’, in the 
Hebrew bible. “No other command (except to recognize the supremacy of God) is repeated as often – more 
than thirty times!” (Plaut, 17)   
                                                
3 from Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context. (1999) (!) Thompson 
Educational Publishing, Inc., Toronto. 
4 abbreviations for titles by Mary Jo Leddy: RG = Radical Gratitude, BCH = At the Border Called Hope 
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Some examples include Exodus 23:9: “You shall not oppress a stranger, for you know the heart of 
a stranger, because you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” In Deuteronomy 10:19, this non-oppression is 
expanded into the commandment to “Therefore love the stranger…” (for the same reason as above). Love 
surely involves feeding, clothing, sheltering, protecting from harm. 
 The Hebrew Bible speaks of the tradition of cities of refuge, of refuge at the sanctuary altar, and 
later, after Christ, in churches and monasteries. Asylum was offered to criminals or anyone fleeing any 
group of people, whether from the same land or from abroad. They would not be surrendered without the 
agreement of the priest. 
The (divine) Other appears as the other person in Matthew 25: 35. Telling the blessed why they 
will inherit the kingdom, Christ says, “for I was hungry and you gave Me food; I was thirsty and you gave 
Me drink; I was a stranger and you took Me in…”, and finally the joyful command: “Let brotherly love 
continue. Do not forget to entertain strangers, for by so doing some have unwittingly entertained angels.” 
Hebrews 13:1-2 
 These ideas are echoed in a stunning passage from Mary Jo Leddy: 
How blessed we would be if we recognized the arrival of refugees as  
a time of visitation. In their very otherness, in their very strangeness, 
they summon us to a deeper awareness of the scene that grips liberal 
democracies: the imperialism of the ego… When we are visited by  
someone genuinely other than ourselves, someone who is like God, 
we are tempted to reduce him or her to the status of an object. 
                 (Plaut, 20)  
 
Hers is the voice of someone living the words and ideas of a glorious Christianity. While never questioning 
the foundation of the liberal state or the existence of nation-states, Leddy meditates on the decline and 
overdevelopment of the ‘West’. She is sharply critical of the ‘materialism’ and ‘consumerism’, and the 
narrative of progress u nderpinning them. She opposes to them the notion of gratitude.  
 Awareness of the miracle of creation – gratitude that God made the world and its inhabitants, 
including the self – generates an ‘economy of grace’. Grace breaks the hypnosis generated by capitalism: 
“in the culture of money, we are held captive by the assumption that all relationships are contractual…” 
(RG, 56) In such a world, whatever is not, or cannot be bought or sold, is holy. 
 One who is grateful for creation can live in the mystery of the superabundance of God’s 
unconditional love, which is never earned nor deserved. Mystery is wholly underrated as a political force. 
Knowledge as an exclusive way of participating in reality results in all the depravities associated with 
possessing and controlling information. What is xenophobia if not fear of the unknown? Much more on this 
later.  
 God’s love is all the more mysterious from ‘our’ position in ‘the most powerful culture in the 
world’, conditioned as we are by the ‘fundamental spiritual distortions’ of capitalism. Here, ingratitude, the 
perpetual dissatisfaction that drives our ‘wanting and doing’ (to make use of Gadamer’s expression), is 
conceived of as sin. And well conceived, to the extent that Christian thought notices and attempts to 
respond to the thirsting – the insatiable desire – that is the seed of every dissatisfaction.  
 Indeed, the need for more meaning in people’s lives is a cornerstone of this discourse. Awakening 
to creation leads naturally to purpose: “Understanding that we are from God and with God is also to 
become aware of how we are meant to be for God.” (RG, 8, her emphasis) What one must do will one day 
beckon, and even startle: A middle -class woman walked into the one room which a refugee had called the 
‘Ritz’ “and was shaken, indeed summoned, by the sight of another woman intent on creating a home out of 
almost nothing... Call it an awakening, call it being turned inside out…”, (BCH, 215-16) but the woman 
began to donate material goods and volunteer her time. 
 But if our interpellation as a subject is a wound and a blessing, and if this sweet burden is laid 
upon us thus – “There may be a day when someone crashes through the door of our self-contained world… 
and we are summoned. There is no one else. This you must do.” (RG, 2) – then, the subject in question is 
really an individual, with all the enlightenment overtones that make myself and at least some of my gentle 
readers a bit wary. This individual has something like a teleological dimension; as indebted and grateful 
souls, we “become freer to live in interdependent ways in which we become more truly who we are.” (RG, 
62) What are the implications of this ‘truly’?  
 Though she remains vigilant against the myth of total autonomy, and warns against a new-agey 
overcultivation of interiority in a hostile world (RG, 119), she cannot avoid the slightly deterministic, 
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slightly romantic image of a solitary disciple harkening to their particular calling. Then again, real plurality 
is predicated on real unicity, accomplished through God’s love which loves each person infinitely and 
uniquely into being (RG, 57), and which “is not simply spread out in a homogeneous sort of way, but rather 
takes a particular and incalculable form within each person.” (RG, 57) 
 Mary Jo Leddy describes the moment the face of a stranger comes to her door: 
 I try not to look too closely, to question with my eyes. This will not  
            become a checkpoint, another place of interrogation. 
            “Please. Come in. You are welcome here.” 
            The face does not move. So, once again I summon up the language  
            of my hands, drawing the face from out of the door frame towards the   
            closest chair in the front room. The face moves forward and lowers  
 itself. 
 “Tea? Water?” I cup the invisible liquid in my hand and bring it to  
 my lips. The head swings slowly upwards and then bows.  
 This means yes or I remember tea or if it pleases you or I don’t know 
 any more or it doesn’t matter or that would be lovely. 
 …As I place the pot under the tap, I try to stop the flow of questions  
 in my mind. Who are you? Where are you from? Why are you here? 
 Stop. You must wonder who I am, where I am from and why I am here. 
 
 After their faces, come proper names. Leddy is determined to protect these faces and names from 
becoming files, in a ‘justice’ system that defaces and erases the person. Part of how she does this is by 
telling the stories of real refugees to the public, by making “an effort to communicate the blessing and the 
burden of what I have heard… Some day, when their future feels more secure, some of these refugees will 
tell their own stories… in their own voices. For now they remain reluctant to speak, prefer to remain 
invisible.” (BCH, 4) I hope she’s sure about what they prefer! Still, from my own experience in this field, I 
know that refugees can be pretty convincing that this is exactly what they want. Where the line is, between 
narrating and narrativizing someone else’s life, remains to be located. Much to her credit, in her books she 
includes the stories of the volunteers and interns in her house. The cleverest of those I came across 
articulates this about listening to stories: “I know I can help carry some of their burden without totally 
understanding it.” (BCH, 227) Well, bless you, sister. 
 And how do refugees experience being the recipients of aid, such as welfare or assistance with 
food and shelter? What is their reality – how do they perceive existence and operate within it? (Krulfeld, 
23) Programmes here are not as systematic and dehumanizing as overseas camps, where they are given 
unfamiliar food and inappropriate clothing (although , food bank food is pretty culturally myopic)… where 
they are truly numbers without faces. In such camps, administrators go to terrifying lengths to maintain 
control over the distribution of aid in highly structured and regimented environments.  
 Nevertheless, here as there, general policies are decided upon with no input from the refugees 
currently affected by them. (Harrell-Bond, 139) Here as there, individuals are made to place themselves 
within a restrictive and pathologizing discourse. 
 It is far from uncommon for a newly arrived refugee – in religious communities or otherwise – to 
encounter verbal and facial expressions of shock and sympathy. Though coming from the best intentions, 
such compassion can be suffocating, frustrating or simply insulting, especially if attended by an implication 
that the sympathizer ‘understands’. More seriously, there can be an overwhelming dissonance between 
what is  being-felt-sorry -for and the actual experience of the refugee. Many stories are not characterized 
only by tragedy and loss, but also include heroism and pride. A man from Argentina who had been detained 
and tortured recounted “how he hated the ‘how sorry’ statements of helpers… He explained how such 
statements of sympathy could undermine the very identity of someone who has had the courage to suffer 
for principles.” (Harrell-Bond, 139)  
 One who feels like a warrior – what’s more, a just warrior – has perhaps even less patience for 
emotional and psychological humiliation than the general population; “Frequently refugees describe the 
behaviour of the helpers they meet as patronizing and condescending.” (Harrell-Bond, 142) What is 
perhaps the most outrageous and degrading is the position allotted to the refugee in this discourse, “the role 
which they are forced to assume to get (help).” (H-B, 140) Sadness and longing for what has been lost, 
helplessness and gratitude for any and all assistance are all expected by a generous civil society that seems 
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happy to almost write a “charity script of the needy and the grateful.” (H-B, 143) Witness the images of 
suffering used in the media for many funding drives;  
“Pictures depict refugees in postures of submission, despair and utter destitution.” (H-B, 149) This kind of 
imagery obliterates the fact that each individual seeks asylum for unique causes that are not self-evident in 
the picture; nor then can ‘salvation’ be standardized.   
 If faced with a life or death situation (does it bear emphasizing here that most refugees do literally 
and legitimately fear for their lives?), an individual may wind up ingratiating him or herself to whatever 
authority, even though it offends the soul. This approval-seeking experience, common with receiving 
welfare or any kind of social assistance, may be the first in a lifetime of losing status, of accepting 
anything. Many refugees were wealthy and powerful in their country of origin, a fact, again, that may leave 
them reading off the wrong script with helpers and benefactors.  
 Mary Jo Leddy claims that if one is serving refugees for the love of God and not for remuneration, 
then the notion of reciprocity is a moot point. (BCH, 108) This may well be the case for the helper, but for 
a refugee it may be that his or her inability to reciprocate is totally traumatizing. The obligation and 
impotence he or she may feel may not be at all reconcilable with a self or cultural image: 
 [Sponsorship in Canada is]… grounded in an ideal western concept of  
 charity… practically expressed in highly symbolic forms of asymmetrical 
 social exchange for which refugee individuals… rarely find a personally 
 and culturally acceptable model. 
      (Harrell-Bond, 137) 
 
Mary Jo Leddy (again beautifully) answers this dilemma by telling those she helps to pay someone else 
back in the future, that the refugee will find his or her own stranger to help in another situation. (RG, 151) 
If somehow the caveats of a radically respectful critical theory could be taken together with this last idea, 
the helpers of refugees would begin the exodus to the territory of justice, and know that to approach it we 
must move well beyond charity. And that charity and love are due to all people. 
 But so often charity degenerates into a saccharine philanthropy, where nice folks congratulate 
themselves on their sensitivity to ‘cultural differences’. A befriending programme that shall remain 
unnamed brags that it “also offers a service to Canadians, that is, the broader cross -cultural awareness and 
the interpersonal development and personal enrichment.” (Sharma, 175)  
            This kind of image motivates all sorts of people to offer themselves in a feel-good sacrifice of time 
and energy: “Refugees attract ‘volunteers’, often people with no specialized training, who often behave as 
though they ‘need refugees more than refugees need them’.” (Harrell-Bond, 150) And that is an insult to 
the truth-value of language that we could all take personally. 
 
Marxism 
            It would be simplifying to the point of meaninglessness to place all these terms, movements or 
practices I will talk about under the umbrella of a generic ‘Marxism’. Reality is far more complicated: 
several ‘marxists’ don’t exhibit the problems I will name, lots of the activities are indistinguishably woven 
together with Christian ethics, and lots of these folks have never heard of Marx. But what they share is a 
critical and structural understanding of injustice, a concern for self-representation, and the conviction that 
problems must b e solved with and not for those most harmed by them.  
 There is no more incisive, coherent attack on the mass hallucinations underwriting the niceties of 
the liberal state than antiracist, anti-oppression, feminist critical theory. Nor can we underestimate the 
effects of this interruption that questioned the foundations of the liberal worldview and transformed its 
academic culture in particular. No one site impacts the lives of newly arrived refugees more than the site of 
‘culture’ and refreshingly, marxists are unable to think of culture as divorced from class and ideology. 
 The smiling face of tolerance and the facile, condescending discourse on ‘cultural differences’ 
have gained social (and real political/economic) currency in the last thirty years in Canada under the banner 
of state-sanctioned ‘multiculturalism’. In these years, all the ‘ethnic communities’ of Toronto (and of all 
major Canadian cities) have been neatly constructed and narrativized, complete with tasty foods, exotic 
clothes and anecdotes of wacky cultural misunderstandings. 
 Himani Bannerji offers a lucid analysis of this official, elite multiculturalism as an ideological 
apparatus of a racist, capitalist state. Through it, all the ‘progressive’, vive-la-difference words people utter 
are revealed as ammunition in the ‘low-intensity warfare’ (Bannerji, 8) being waged on new Canadians. 
Individuals who never in their lives self-identified as ‘Latina’ are suddenly a member of a ‘community’ in 
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Toronto. The fact that some-of-your-best-friends-are-Latina notwithstanding, this community is a category 
of the state.  
 The labels that contain and organize these communities can more accurately be identified as 
interpellation devices that accomplish a segmentation of both the labour market and political space. They 
represent a reduction of people’s economic demands to ‘cultural’ ones, rearranging questions of justice into 
ones of diversity (Bannerji 9, 45), aiming to distract the neurosurgeon stuck driving a taxi with a folkdance 
festival. ‘Multiculturalis m’ was never a demand from below, but an ideological tool managed from above.    
 Opposed to this hegemony is a ‘popular multicultural politics’. It “must articulate itself through a 
politicized understanding of cultural representation. Antiracist and feminist class politics must be its 
articulating basis… which would prevent [it] from falling prey to colonial, racist discourse or to those of 
ethnic nationalisms. Such a popular framing of culture would not engage in fetishized and essentialized 
traditions.” (Bannerji, 5) Instead of referencing reified and static labels, and their comforting chains of 
association (is this not the challenge with every human one encounters?), this politics offers a way to 
actively remember that people do not have fixed agencies, political or otherwise. Everyone, “as subjects of 
complex and contradictory social relations can be summoned as subjects and agents in diverse ways.” 
(Bannerji, 6) The experiences of real(ized) people are relational and historical junctures that are informed 
by a multiplicity of traditions and power relations. No one is less complicated than I am. No one.    
Everywhere it is communicated to refugees that they are here on public sufferance and are to be 
grateful. Everywhere it is communicated that they are visibly other than the norm. They are “…made to 
feel that otherness is of an antagonistic variety… and they also know that this otherness is not in them, but 
in how they are perceived….” (Bannerji, 46, my emphasis) Respect would build communities where people 
could define themselves. Out of respect comes dignity, the basic principle of which is accepting the 
autonomy of the other, and being honest about the power relations that hinder their autonomy. (Bannerji, 
149) 
Praxis, as a revolutionary enterprise, puts theoretical abstraction in a dialectic with material 
conditions and structures, a dialectic animated by the specific pressures and possibilities of the immediate 
historical moment. Emphasis on the historicity of the moment recognizes that “each individual is the 
synthesis not only of existing relations, but of the history of these relations.” (Boggs, 28) How different the 
thinking of refugee protection would be if the history of the relations of those involved were more present 
in the discourse! A reckoning with the structurally bequeathed benefits of, say, colonization, enjoyed by the 
dominant society would shift the conversation from ‘burdensharing’ to reparations, and to the duty to 
compensate the victims of social and economic crimes. 
 This history h as no room for charity; the god who loves the poor is exposed as an ideological tool. 
In Antonio Gramsci’s words, “The philosophy of praxis is absolute ‘historicism’, the absolute 
secularization and earthiness of thought, an absolute humanism of history.” (Boggs, 29) He recognized that 
“religious faith… tends to instill an apolitical fatalism among the oppressed and therefore must be 
combated as an anti-revolutionary ideology.” (Boggs, 34) 
 What (withers and) disappears from this worldly and historical conception of action is exactly a 
certain charity. The possibility of, and meaning of, a benign figure of authority and power becomes 
nonsense. Revolutionary transformation will not follow from the expression of an individual saint’s piety or 
hero’s will, but from ongoing and collective political action. This action, although voluntary, is “anchored 
in class analysis and historical understanding [and is distinguished] from non-Marxist approaches like 
the… exaltation of the ‘act’, which viewed the self-conscious activity of a few leaders as a powerful causal 
force that could transcend historical conditions.” (Boggs, 31) The power to change the world will never be 
granted by the dominant social strata whose existence, in any case, will be blown away by this change. 
After all, the notion of ‘granting’ things like rights or self-government is oxymoronic; “freedom is acquired 
by conquest, not by gift.” (Freire, 31) 
 Paulo Freire, deeply influenced by Gramsci, in turn influenced and gave shape to various 
international praxis movements through his work in popular education in Brasil and Chile. The two of them 
catalyzed the movement for participatory research, the political agenda of which always gives priority to 
the oppressed. He has inscribed his attitude all over many of our ‘best practices’ in facilitation, teaching 
and community arts practices. Many refugees in Toronto (trust me) have been to workshops using his 
methods. 
 His is the most accessible elaboration of an explicit epistemological privileging of the oppressed. 
The struggle for internal and external emancipation and the conscious awakening that conditions it must 
originate with their localized, particular and experiential knowledges. The task of the oppressed is to 
FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series 
 
Justice -To-Be-Done / Telling-Stories / Before-The-Birth-Of-The-Plot 
liberate themselves and their oppressors by actions of resistance and love that operate at the structural level. 
The oppressors are unable, unqualified, to lead this struggle. Nor is it sufficient to usurp their place in the 
hierarchy. “It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors… (and) wage the 
struggle to resolve the contradiction in which they are caught… If the goal is to become fully human, they 
will not achieve their goal by merely reversing the terms of the contradiction.” (Freire, 42)  
 This orientation toward structural and collective emancipation does not eclipse the agency of the 
subject. The knowledge of the power relations in the world to which one is awakened must catalyze 
creative and locally determined transformation. Moreover, the process of liberation is conscious: it 
“...makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will 
come their necessary engagement in the struggle…” (Freire, 33) And so agency is central for Gramsci, who 
puts forth “…a theory of human activity as shaped or determined by social structures and which is also the 
subject, creator of new forms that challenges and overturn those same structures.” (Boggs, 31) The 
dialectical relationship of subjectivity and objectivity reinvests the former with purpose while, happily, 
both psychologism and the ‘individual’ of the enlightenment are contested. In the more accessible language 
of Freire, “To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the world and history is 
naïve and simplistic.” (Freire, 35)   
 Solidarity is not coextensive with generosity. The generosity of the sentimental philanthropist can 
only be framed by an unjust social order, whereas “true generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy 
the causes that nourish false charity [which] constrains the fearful and subdued… to extend their trembling 
hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands… need be extended less and less in 
supplication…” (Freire, 29) Solidarity requires far more effort and imp licates the very fabric of the life of 
the helper: “Rationalizing his guilt through paternalistic treatment of the oppressed, all the while holding 
them fast in a position of dependence, will not do. Solidarity requires that one enter into the situation of 
those with whom one is solidary.” (Freire, 34) 
But can I, how meaningfully can I, enter into the situation of a refugee? In banishing charity from 
the discourse, have we also lost grace (that face of charity that carries none of its infantilizing and 
distasteful elements)? Can we afford to proceed without it? And given that the goal is radical social change, 
what happens when the people with whom we work are not in a posture of resistance? “…Often these 
messages of liberation may themselves be instruments of domination, control, pressure, manipulation, ways 
of setting directions, ordering resistance, or even revolution, against a system that the culture-bearers may 
not see as totally disadvantageous… What if those who choose to work with us do not wish to challenge the 
establishment?” (Krulfeld, 30) 
Empowerment discourse can exaggerate agency as well. Harrell-Bond typed the word ‘victim’ in 
those loaded little brackets every time she used it. But what is important about torture, from the perspective 
of justice, is its occurrence. Not how it is ‘perceived’ by anyone, but that it happened. There was a 
perpetrator, so there was a … 
And how cleanly do refugees embody this rather homogeneous category of ‘oppressed’ (in the 
sense intended by Freire, which granted is quite broad but almost always seems to refer to economic 
injustice)? Refugees are sometimes very wealthy; in fact, many are fleeing regimes that persecute precisely 
the wealthy! The helper being placed in the category of ‘oppressor’ (as she is in several circles) is 
problematic as well. There are ambiguous lines here. She is limited by her (usually hierarchical) structure: 
her boss, her funders, and the politics among them. She may feel a mighty solidarity but be oppressed by 
the system she must negotiate. 
Neither Christian nor Marxist ethics can provide the panacea to the tendency to fit refugees into 
generalized models. Both are predicated on the assumption that this population is more -or-less 
homogeneous. Both have an inexorable – sometimes blatant, sometimes subtle – penchant for 
narrativization, for providing a coherent image out of which no remainder can be left. Identity does not 
have the space to be as fluid and multilayered as it actually is in any social group, but perhaps least of all in 
that of refugees. 
Partially at fault is the mythological construction that overdetermines civil society’s general 
perception of ‘the refugee’. Indeed, the label itself evokes a highly narrativized complex of ideas. 
“Although it is rarely articulated, there is a commonly shared psychosocial construction attached to the 
term: refugees are survivors of oppression, plunged into poverty, purified by their suffering, and 
boundlessly grateful for safe haven… The fact that they are not inevitably poor, nor as pure or grateful as 
their hosts might wish, can be a source of difficulty.” (Beiser, 170) 
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The stringent expectation of ‘purity’ is connected to the fetishizing insistence on ‘authenticity’, 
which has to do with far more than confirming the accuracy of the facts. The United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted… is outside [their] country of nationality and is unable, or, owing to such a fear, unwilling to 
seek protection from that country. (Article 1, Geneva Convention, 1951) ‘Poverty’, ‘submissiveness’, and 
‘patience’ are nowhere to be found in this definition. So when refugees are found to be rich rather than 
poor, shrewd rather than innocent, petulant rather than resilient, or are just plain obnoxious people, it 
disrupts the narrative of destitution that lies so deeply in the minds of the charitable who bitterly resent the 
receptacle for their sympathy being, suddenly, little more than a con artist.  
Advocates are justifiably wary of the dangers of reinforcing discourses of vulnerability and 
pathologization, of reinscribing their dependence on us, and of undermining their resilience and capacities, 
but at the same time, the basic structural inequity between a refugee and a helper must be acknowledged. A 
space must be found beyond the relentless narrativization of the refugee in her alterity, a space for the 
‘remainder’, the ‘more’ that recedes away from the story.   
What could answer such a nuanced injunction that demands change at such an elementary level? 
Perhaps one who conceives of alterity not as a problem to be dealt with and integrated – even mosaic-style! 
– but who sees it as “the heart… (as) the inspiration or the very psyche of the soul”? (OTB, 109) 
 
First Philosophy 
The thinking of Emmanuel Levinas both resists narrativization and provides conceptual tools with 
which to resist narrativization. His writing is descriptive of fields irreducible to linear exposition; never 
dogmatic, its rhythm nevertheless repeats the question: What do I have to do with justice? The answer(s) 
never provide the sense of comfort and closure that accompanies being enfolded back into a totality. They 
exceed any possible narration. 
 One or another version of totality has been the panacea offered for violence and war throughout 
Western history. For a totalizing consciousness, ‘rational peace’ becomes the subsumption of conflicting 
terms under a third communitarian or contractual term. This movement is also enacted in the philosophical 
tradition, in which the “conflicts between the same and the other are resolved by theory whereby the other 
is reduced to the same.” (T&I, 47) The algorithm that accomplishes the reduction is “a middle and neutral 
term that ensures the comprehension of being.” (T&I, 43) The neutral term is able to bring the separate 
terms into a relation by grasping them as products of privation from something more inclusive.  
Com-prehension – taking everything into one’s hands – is always the adventure of the same: the 
knowing being illuminates and so fails to encounter anything that could limit it or even truly surprise it. 
Everything can be integrated; knowledge – even in absolute distance a grasping – is a modality of 
possession or consumption. This is the way of the same and the very structure of intentionality. 
“Thematization and conceptualization are… suppression or possession of the other.” (T&I, 46)  
Ontology, concerned with the realization of existence or Being rather than relating to actual 
existents, suspends the alterity of those beings by shining upon them the anonymous light of intelligibility. 
This luminosity is always deployed as a neutral radiance, bringing reality to light, dis -covering and 
revealing Being’s objective exposition. Its latent domination and tyranny is palpable, for exa mple, in the 
impartial voice of the average school textbook. It is disembodied and amazingly, the body that it does not 
have is most certainly not anything other than white and male. Indeed, the kind of ontology that galvanizes 
this voice is a “philosophy of power, which does not call into question the same, a philosophy of injustice.” 
(T&I, 46)  
Ontology, then, is an imperialist ‘egology’, which “promotes freedom – the freedom that is the 
identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other.” (T&I, 42) Thus even the 
experience of alienation would be re-integrated as my ‘sensation’ or my ‘experience’ of alienation. Here 
justice is subordinated to freedom: real – not rational – peace requires a respect and a ‘letting be’ of 
difference and plurality, whereas Ontology enacts “its liberation by the suppression of multiplicity.” (T&I, 
302) Transcendence also demands plurality – a term radically exterior to the same and not appropriated into 
its interiority. 
What is always already interrupting the totalizing intentionality of the same is the notion of 
infinity. This infinity is positive insofar that non-knowing does not equal nothingness; the interruption 
inaugurates a situation other than one of knowing and non- knowing. Infinity is not intrinsic to me but 
arrives in the concrete form of the face of the other human being, “which is by itself and not by reference to 
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a system.” (T&I, 75) In other words, what breaches totality is not an operation of thought but is thought 
“faced with an other re fractory to categories.” (T&I, 40)     
 This non-allergic relation with a non-thematizable alterity first submits me to judgment; the 
presence of the other is all that is capable of putting in question the naïve legitimacy of my freedom and 
demanding justification for it. The absolute strangeness of the face defies conceptualization yet bears an 
injunction; from the start, this relation is communicative. “Discourse conditions thought, for the first 
intelligible is not a concept, but an intelligence whose inviolable exteriority the face states in uttering ‘you 
shall not commit murder.” The essence of discourse is ethical.” (T&I, 216) The bond with the other that is 
not a representation of the other, and that does not constitute a totality, is the ethical relation, taken as first 
philosophy, pre-logical or alogical and absolutely a priori. It is the precondition for all language and the 
birthplace of subjectivity itself. 
 Such a relation can only obtain between beings that are radically separate from each other 
(moreover, they are positively so and not in negation of one another); no type of union can mediate the 
irreducible distance between my interlocutor and me, as the same and the other do not inhabit the same 
plane. In the properly ethical relation as oppos ed to ontology, the other and I ‘do not form a number’; we 
are not two terms in a system visible from the outside. “Transcendence designates a relation with a reality 
infinitely distant from my own reality, yet without this distance destroying the relation and without this 
relation destroying the distance.” (T&I, 41, amended translation)  
 Across an absolute distance the face arouses in me a ‘metaphysical’ Desire, insatiable because it is 
neither a need nor a hunger. It does not have the structure of intentionality, or any object as its correlate. It 
is Desire for the Good, for the Good for the other, and infinitely more and better than that. 
 This is possible because the ethical relation is characterized first of all by asymmetry. The other is 
possessed of hyperbolic height and humility, and in Desire are conjoined the movements unto both. (T&I, 
200) Metaphysical Desire opens the dimension of height in its aiming for the invisible, for the inaccessible 
and inordinate, that which overflows all impressions of it. But the manifestation of such a non-object is in 
the defenseless eyes of the human face before me, which is the “source from which all meaning appears, 
the face in its absolute nudity, in its destitution as a head that does not find a place to lay itself…” (T&I, 
299) It is the humility that arouses the basic human shame that seeks justification for my freedom, and 
apologizes, all the way to dying for the other. 
 All this, however, is not an injunction to self-negation or disappearance into passion: the ethical 
relation is not self-sacrifice but discourse. I cannot meet the other without simultaneously expressing the 
encounter, without (failing to greet or) greeting. To name is to invoke or call: “Desire for exteriority has 
appeared to us to move not in objective cognition but in Discourse, which in turn has presented itself as 
justice, in the uprightness of the welcome made to the face.” (T&I, 82) Hospitality issues from a finite 
being who has an idea of the infinite. The subject as host does not first ‘perceive’ or represent the other, but 
greets the other in the very contact.  
 The uprightness of the welcome made. To welcome you is to do justice by you, for you, with you, 
on your behalf. Because you do not appear alone. How clandestine and absurd (and easy!) it would be if 
you did. For Levinas, the other is at no point abstracted from sociality. The face always already harbours a 
third person – the other of the other, and all the other others. 
Intimate, closed society – a dual society – of the other and me is love of the neighbour and as such 
depends on chance proximity. (The Ego and the Totality:  CPP, 31) Here fault can be pardoned because the 
one wronged received all the evil of the wrong, and can dispose of the right to pardon. (T, 30) The recovery 
of my ego’s sovereignty is possible in a society where the meaning of my act is exhausted by my intention 
(where its repercussions cannot escape my awareness), or by repentance and absolution. For example, in 
Christianity, the forgiveness of sins generates a supremely non-public situation. But magic has no place in 
duty; “No one, not even God, can substitute himself for the victim.” (A Religion for Adults: DF, 16)  
 All this is outside the question of justice and injustice. True violence can only happen in tru e 
society where “I act in a sense that escapes me… (where)… I am the bearer of a fault which is not reflected 
in my intentions. I am objectively guilty” (T, 31) of deeds that do not belong to the order of pardon. In a 
true society, love cannot redeem me; “ Love makes blind the respect which is impossible without blindness 
toward the third person and is only a pious intention oblivious of the real evil.” (T, 31)  
The innocence of love, then, is always disrupted. I cannot rest complacently, knowing I do right 
by you, as it is impossible to isolate ourselves “forgetting all who remain outside of the amorous dialogue.” 
(T, 32) Now we must make our conversation public, and be as straightforward there as we were privately 
only a few pages ago. Though “the social wrong is something committed without my knowledge, against a 
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multitude of third parties whom I will never face” (T, 33), it is a wrong the ego knows it alone is 
responsible for in a preoriginal way. They can be corrected only by “the difficult detour that le ads to third 
parties that have remained outside of love.” (T, 33) Justice, then, is generalized; “the law has priority over 
charity.” (T, 33) 
The law that controls states, protects their interests, and regulates their inter-national relations 
certainly does seem to trump charity in the effect it has on human populations. In order to explore the 
ethical dimensions this opens, let us suppose that the third parties under discussion are refugees. Can we 
entertain the literal notion that, besides defenseless eyes and absolute nudity, each face has a demographic 
and is contextualized by socio-economic realities? After all, no “interhuman relationship can be enacted 
outside of economy; no face can be approached with empty hands and closed home.” (T&I, 172) Could the 
freedom and privilege of the hosts in rich Western nations be ‘called into question’ by newcomers?  
In a cogent and moving indictment of his government’s abuse and detention of asylum-seekers, 
Australian professor Joseph Pugliese agrees that refugees, the most “disenfranchised of human subjects, 
exercise a power… to put into question this ‘my -for-me’: this is our land, our home, our wealth, our 
relaxed and comfortable place in the sun – and yet you stand there, in your indecent state of utter 
destitution, and proceed to call into question our mode of existence.” (Pugliese, 9, my emphasis)  
The situation – the socioeconomic position – of a refugee brings into sharp focus exactly what is at 
stake in taking the ethical relation seriously. It is also a good point at which to begin exploring the relation 
between the ethical and the political. Professor Pugliese suggests that the ethical duty to provide assistance 
to refugees must be articulated “not as a chore or as a service that has to be begrudgingly rendered, but as 
an embrace… a corporeal act of refuge in the face of hostility and suffering. The embrace is the ultimate 
incarnation of generosity… transcendent as it conjoins two subjects in an act of affirmation without 
obliterating difference.” (Pugliese, 9) 
Duty conceived not as a chore but as transcendence is coherent only beginning from a certain 
conception of subjectivity. It cannot be emphasized enough that for Levinas, ethics is first philosophy. 
Ethics is not derivative from any natural or religious laws or principles, or from reason. Levinas neither 
gives an empirical description of what actually obtains, nor offers a moral code or any normative 
prescription. Rather than convincing us to be good, he gives a phenomenological description of the ethical 
relation as precondition of all such argumentation, and “refers the activity of convincing back to the appeal 
inherent in the ethical relation…” (Horowitz, 4) This relation is no more a ‘moment’ of experience than 
each person is an ‘instantiation’ of the human being. Before an ‘individual’, the subject is an orientation to, 
by, and for the other, without which there will have been no subject. (Horowitz, 5)    
Only ontology – wherein “ideality leads to coinciding with oneself” (OTB, 99) – would require 
justification for such a privileging of the other, and the duty and concern it introduces. “Am I my brother’s 
keeper? [This question has] meaning only if one has already supposed that the ego is concerned only with 
itself, is only a concern for itself.” (OTB, 117) But how is it that I do not coincide with myself, and how is 
the other found even before the beginning of subjectivity? 
Levinas found it necessary to adjust the language used in Totality and Infinity (first published in 
French in 1961) which had a more ‘external’ emphasis, in order to describe the ethical relation beginning 
more from ‘within’ subjectivity. This move also goes more rigorously into what is meant by the 
‘beginning’ – the genesis – of  subjectivity and the ethical relation. In Otherwise Than Being (from 1981), 
he describes subjectivity as irreducible to consciousness by “starting with sensibility interpreted not as a 
knowing but as proximity, (and) seeking in language contact and sensibility, behind the circulation of 
information it becomes.” (OTB, 100) 
The relation between contact and information is phenomenologically reduced in his analysis of 
saying and the said. What is not Being or essence, and not nothingness, is an ‘otherwise than being’ which, 
filling a similar place in the discourse as  infinity did in Totality and Infinity, cannot be thematized and is 
not a ‘modality’ of anything else. Such a pre-originary and anarchical goodness belongs to a past not of the 
order of any possible memory. It could not have ever been present to the subject as it is that which made 
the subject possible. This non-present time is the time of the ethical relation, the time, in a sense, of saying.  
‘At’ or ‘from’ this time, the one who is approached “belongs to the concreteness of the meeting 
without being able to take the distance necessary for the objectifying gaze” ( Uniqueness:  en, 193), and it is 
this sheer involvement  that does “justice to the difference of the other person.” (T, 193) Saying is the 
greeting in this proximity, the “iteration of exposure… expression, sincerity…(it) differs from an act 
commencing in a conquering and voluntary ego.” (OTB, 153) As such, it cannot be encompassed: it cannot 
be stated. 
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Yet justice demands that it be stated, and language is indispensable. The otherwise than being 
must almost be translated into being, or talked about as though it were an event of being; always saying 
must be betrayed in the said (in both senses of that word). The “subordination of the saying to the said, to 
the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that manifestation demands.” (OTB, 6) Levinas’ question 
is whether this betrayal can be reduced, both phenomenologically and empirically. 
The said cannot but convey being and essence. But the said is not evil, nor does it necessarily 
‘falsify’ the saying. There is no such thing as an unadulterated saying unmediated by the said. 
“Thematization… theory and thought… do not attest to some fall of the saying. They are motivated by 
responsibility itself.” (OTB, 6) Hence we are called to assemble and represent what cannot be assembled or 
represented. But this is not a ‘paradox’. This, precisely, is the structure of the ethical and political vis -à-vis 
one another. The parallel process therein is the advent of judgment, and all the conceptual tools needed to 
elaborate and implement it. The introduction of justice is “the birth of the theoretical.” (Philosophy, Justice, 
and Love:  en, 104)  
Recall that the law has priority over charity, and that real justice and injustice can only relate to 
society and not the intimate neighbour. The other, in the face-to-face relation, is absolutely singular and 
unique, “exterior to and transcending all genus.” (Uniqueness:  en, 194) To this other goes the saying, the 
expression of the meeting, and language is not labour. (Labour can be alienated from the will, it can be 
reified and perverted, beyond recognition by the intention that performed it… work works in the territory of 
Being.) The singularity of the unique one signifies in love. “Farther than with the known individual, there 
is, with the absolutely other, human peace and proximity…” (T, 194) ‘Love as a logical operation’ is love 
of the incomparable, immeasurable, but the responsibility germane to this love announces the ‘moment of 
justice’.  
Now a need for decision is fe lt, and an appeal is made to a “reason capable of comparing the 
incomparable, a wisdom of love. A measure superimposes itself on the ‘extravagant’ generosity of the ‘for 
the other’, on its infinity.” (T, 195) Judgment and objectivity are demanded insofar as “it takes institutions 
to arbitrate and a political authority to support (justice, which) requires and establishes the state.” (T, 196) 
(!) Note that above no claim was made that the relation wasn’t problematic, only that it wasn’t a paradox! 
Just as it with labour, institutions established to bring and guard justice are far more often than not 
perverted and alienated, and Levinas is certainly critical of the state per se. Nevertheless, just as saying 
requires the said, ethics requires that we seek public, social and generalized mechanisms of justice.   
And that these mechanisms be much better than they are. Perhaps so much better than they are that 
they are no longer the same mechanisms, even perhaps no longer mechanisms at all. It is in trying to 
articulate the reconciliation of hyperbolic, unconditional love and a politics inevitably rife with 
compromises, that Levinas’ earlier assertion fully resonates: “Justice summons me to go beyond the 
straight line of justice (or the law), and henceforth nothing can mark the end of this march.” (T&I, 245)   
Lest the poetry of his formulations be confused with rhetoric and the intensity of his language 
allow one to consider his ethics as some mere ‘regulating ideal’, it bears mentioning that the theme of 
economic justice appears repeatedly in his work. He even speaks of money itself, asking, “Can one 
conceive of a justice without quantity and without reparation?” (The Ego and the Totality:  CPP, 45) It also 
needs to be said that Levinas leaves much of the work of imagining the specifics of a better future justice to 
his students, leaves the work of elaborating a politics to other thinkers (say, to political philosophers). But 
he does give excellent clues: 
Labour, institutions, and religions are products of human will, and “the will, by virtue of its 
essence exposed to violence, can be emancipated only by building a world in which it suppresses the 
occasions for betrayal.” (T, 39) This rejoins the sentiment expressed earlier in a more literal register by 
Gramsci and Freire. Working against the structural injustice of society is better than acts of charity, which, 
at least with refugees, have been shown to invite the possibility of “interrupting their continuity, making 
them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves…” (T&I, 21) 
But Levinas is only in harmony with Marxian thought up to a point: though the latter recognizes 
the other, its relation to the same is overly symmetrical. “Marxism… consists in saying: We can save the 
other if he himself demands his due.5 Marxism invites humanity to demand what is my duty to give it. 
                                                
5 The author has thus far sneakily avoided using quotations involving the unfortunate, ubiquitous masculine 
pronouns. That Levinas is still enchained to sexist language, however, is related to his failure to sufficiently 
disengage from ontological language, which is the very preoccupation driving the discourse of saying & the 
said, a preoccupation he admits to and expresses with superlative self-reflexivity.   
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That’s a bit different from my radical distinction between me and others…” (Philosophy, Justice, and Love: 
en, 119) It is precisely out of this distinction that one cannot dispense entirely with charity. Love, mercy, 
and charity: justice is only the rigorous and social dimension of these. Both sides are required; “charity is 
impossible without justice, and justice is warped without charity,” (T, 121) or, “responsibility is all the 
gravity of love…”  
How are these feelings of tenderness possible? Why does Levinas claim [as he does in “Useless 
Suffering” (1982)] that suffering can be meaningful in me but in the other is always absurd, outrageous and 
unjustifiable? How can he say that “love is originary”? (T, 108)  
The conception of subjectivity elaborated in both Totality and Infinity and Otherwise Than Being 
can be traced back to sensibility, an incarnated mortal dwelling in enjoyment. But this rest and peace is in 
fact never to be; the ego “does  not find any rest in itself… unquiet, not coinciding with itself.” (OTB, 8) 
What has already happened to de-phase it, tear it up from its synthesis? What needs to be described is not 
an event nor an essence, but rather how the human being signifies in the first place, or signification itself, 
which precedes any essence. 
The possibility of signifyingness is exactly what has already happened, and this possibility is 
understood as substitution . We signify out of, and in, proximity to the other. “This breakup of identity, this 
changing of being into signification, that is, into substitution, is the subject’s subjectivity, or its subjection 
to everything… its vulnerability, that is, its sensibility.” (OTB, 14) Disinterestedness, gratitude and 
expiation all name this substitution, a being-for-the-other in a responsibility that goes all the way to 
substituting me for the other. 
Responsibility for the other is a passivity more passive than mere receptivity, “more passive than 
all patience, passivity of the accusative form, implicating the identity of a hostage who substitutes himself 
for all the others.” (OTB, 15) Accusative, prior to any wrongdoing: accused even “of what the others do or 
suffer…” (OTB, 112) This infinite, unassumable responsibility rises from exposure to proximity, which is 
not a way of ‘knowing’ or understanding a relation between two simultaneous or equal terms that ‘appear’ 
to one another; it is necessary to “emphasize the breakup of this synchrony, of this whole by the difference 
between the same  and the other in the non-indifference of the obsession exercised by the other over the 
same.” (OTB, 85) The idea of admitting a fundamental difference between oneself and the others arouses 
suspicion in many, but the suspicion is framed by and tied to all the old philosophical concepts that we are 
trying here to displace. The project is to articulate a more original connection among us, a kinship other 
than that which ties us to Being, “one that will perhaps enable us to conceive of… this inequality in a sense 
absolutely opposed to oppression.” (OTB, 177)  
Obsession with responsibility for the other is not a function of rational judgment or cognition and, 
due to the asymmetry of the relation, is non-reciprocatable. Thus the difference between the same and the 
other is that the obsession is mine. The ethical relation begins only with me; responsibility goes further than 
being and so further than identity, “identity not of a soul in general, but for me, for in me alone innocence 
can be accused without absurdity. To accuse the innocence of the other, to ask of the other more than he 
owes, is criminal.” (OTB, 195) 
The accusation of my innocence can proceed only from the glorious mystery of election . 
Responsibility that does not issue from any decision taken on my  part, that “rests on no free commitment… 
effected without any choice… (and) precedes the freedom/ nonfreedom couple” (OTB, 116) is the 
unconditionality of the subject. Unconditional and so non-transferable – and though, as we will see, it is 
possible to evade – it is impossible to decline responsibility, as if I “found myself… the one who, 
summoned, heard the imperative as an exclusive recipient; as if, henceforth chosen and unique, I had to 
answer for the death and, consequently, the life, of the other.” (Uniqueness:  en, 193) Election indicates me 
as a non-interchangeable, irreplaceable unicity, not equal to the other, but always more responsible. Thus is 
the state of a hostage, “always to have one degree of responsibility more.” 
 To avoid being transported by hyperbolic description (but is it, or is it just shocking to hear it 
stated aloud?), we must return to the situation of arriving refugees and their hosts. Always the human 
multiplicity pulls me away from proximity, away from responsibility prior to judgment (T, 195), and 
demands a social justice. 
 Professor Pugliese agrees that my ‘non-transferable’ obligation to refugees is to offer 
unconditional hospitality. Unconditionality demands no due: not gratitude, not solidarity, nor to fit a 
prescribed image or narrative. The struggle in Professor Pugliese’s country, however, is to institute a far 
more basic hospitality, that of simple refuge or asylum. It’s an obligation that Prime Minister John Howard 
is having no problems at all evading. Sadly, the direction currently being taken by Canada will soon see us 
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not far ahead of Australia, even though, as he notes, both countries have encoded their non-transferable 
responsibilities in their signatures on the United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees. (Pugliese, 8) 
 Professor Pugliese’s essay stands out in that he presents himself as an academic and also as an 
ego, unable to decline a summons and shelterless, grappling with personal dismay and rage over his 
nation’s failure to represent him as a host(age): “In the face of the pain and persecution of the refugee, I 
become hostage to their plea for refuge: the locus of my self becomes subject to the subjection of the 
asylum seeker. Inscribed in the Prime Minister’s fear and a nxiety… is the intolerable knowledge that he is 
already hostage, ipso facto, to an ethical relation that he may disavow and disown but that he cannot 
overcome or sever.” (Pugliese, 9) 
 There is much divergence in the directions Levinasian scholars choose to take his thinking, and 
what they choose to emphasize in his work varies widely. (Even the notion of elaborating a politics at all is 
of interest only in certain readings.) Exactly how the ethical relation can inform refugee policies and 
settlement servic es is justice-to-be-done, and first imagined. My chosen part in this project is to suggest 
that perhaps students of Levinas could teach their governments to reflect the following ‘wisdom of love’: 
divest oneself (the nation or the ego) of illusory and desperate sovereignty and give more and more the gift 
of “the openness… of the doors of one’s home.” (OTB, 74) The welcome is the commencement of 
sociality; no nation, just like no person, be said to live in real peace without it. 
 All this is not even to mention that the ego – both unable to ever coincide with itself and to 
ever abandon itself – is in a state strikingly akin to exile, and so clearly invites a more mature 
empathy with those who are exiled more literally. 
 The effort to reconcile Levinas to the literal and the political – and vice versa – is perhaps the most 
pressing exigency for his students. Would he sanction the leap I am making from the other qua other to the 
other as a foreigner, a refugee with a body in time and space? Is it justified to say that every face has a 
demographic, and if it is, what are the implications of this? Levinas never directly approaches the 
constellation of ideas around ‘the other’ as culturally other, nor speaks directly to the critical analyses 
thereof that attend it in, for example, the field of cultural studies. But the ethics that he develops does leave 
an ample and loving space for others to do that work, work that has been excellently undertaken, especially 
by some feminist thinkers.  
So far, the definition of the human being – of the other – has not hinged on membership in any 
particular community. In seeking a concrete politics and a public gesture toward refugees in particular, one 
is confronted by a very simple question that has not been negotiated by Levinas: If, as he says, uniqueness 
has no genus, are all others just as other as all the other others? It seems that every other with whom I have 
proximity obsesses me, oppressor and oppressed alike: signification “bears even responsibility for the 
persecuting by t he persecutor.” (OTB, 75) 
Yet this line does not and cannot lead to conceiving of the other as blank or generic, without a 
body. For Levinas, the ethical relation explicitly begins in the materiality of the body, that is to say, “the 
possibility of ethical responsibility is located not in consciousness or free will, but specifically in 
incarnation.” (Chanter, 79) Embodiment is the precondition for ethics!  
The original interdependence of incarnation and responsibility is in harmony with a radical and 
critical understanding of power, and denies any legitimacy to that hideous bodiless head who utters the law 
and narrates the school textbook: “Like much of contemporary feminist theory, Levinas’ ethics contests the 
disembodied subject of enunciation and the corresponding reduction of language to formalism.” (Chanter, 
83) His description of subjectivity starting from sensibility, then, “enables the elaboration of the ethical 
significance of flesh” (Chanter, 85), where each priceless body is of the highest value. No value is 
‘associated’ with the body, nor even is the ‘external’ world ever fully separate from it: what I experience in 
the world “somehow belongs to the flesh of the I think.” (The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of 
Culture:  en, 182) Please note the absence, in all his descriptions of corporality, of the word “metaphor”. 
The flesh of the I think. 
This last idea indicates the most difficult to express, and also the most decisive point in Levinas’ 
thinking: the preoriginary nature of the ethical relation. As precondition for every thing, it is also the 
precondition for intentional violence. Separate wills and bodies encountering one another, inventing 
consciousness in each other’s name, are also able to rise to dominate and exploit and torture one another, as 
other animals are not.  
The whole of ‘civilization’ has always prepared structures and contracts to protect us. (In fact, it 
forms the ‘us’ which is thus ‘protected’, as the subjects of contract!) These systems apparently repress our 
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primal, ghastly nature, taking as a given that without them we would be nasty and brutish and eat each 
other. But is it my original evil or goodness being repressed by them? It seems well worth asking which – 
selfishness or being-for-the-other – is limited by society. (Horowitz, 6) But we know which was prior. 
Violence would not ‘succeed’ if the ego were not a hostage. At any rate, “it is not certain that at the 
beginning there was war. Before war there were altars.” (Language and Proximity:  CPP, 124) Suddenly, 
the fact that those are giant faces in the ancient breezes of Easter Island gains a richer signification.  
And before there were citizens, or ‘individuals’, there was the ethical relation, the root of every 
other subsequent imperative. Extending rights to citizens is a secondary movement, and derivative of 
ethics, as Levinas is careful to point out: “As citizens we are reciprocal, but it is a more complex structure 
than the face-to-face.” (Philosophy, Justice, and Love:  en, 107) And so reciprocity, too, is a secondary 
phenomenon. Any ethics predicated on a principle of ‘mutual aid’ is inadequate. We cannot do real justice 
to the multiplicity out of some elaborate and derivative notion of ‘the common good’, for mutuality 
announces conditionality. Precisely because “‘we’ is not the plural of ‘I’” (The Ego and the Totality: CPP, 
43), the other’s response to me cannot concern me; the ethical relation proceeds from me to the other, who 
is always privileged over me.  
Nor can I offer aid to the other in need because ‘i t could have been me’. (Horowitz, 19) Forced 
migration involves structural injustice and political economy so that, so far and for now (in my era, my 
particular geopolitical location, my privileged demographic, none of which are immune to changes) a 
refugee is not ‘someone like me’.     
It (so far and for now) could not have been ‘someone like me’. At any rate, duty arising from an idea of 
universality belongs to the order of knowledge, and we are no longer speaking of ethics. Knowledge does 
not remember this: I do not love justice because I am a person; I am a person because I love justice. “The 
ethical, beyond vision and certitude, delineates the structure of exteriority as such. Morality is not a branch 
of philosophy, but first philosophy.” (T&I, 304) 
 
In Other Words 
 Levinas devoted his life to the phenomenological description of God. Peppering his texts with 
caveats like ‘one cannot prove God thus’ (T&I, 304), and ‘God can only be named by an abuse of 
language’ (Humanism and An-archy:  CPP, 136), he nevertheless proves and names God to me.  Moreover, 
this God can be reconciled to the one of my childhood; the omnipresent, loving and just creator. He does 
this by describing the miracle of a created being, possessed of a created freedom and capable of atheis m. 
 He proves the created-ness of this being by an astoundingly rigorous description of time, of the 
diachronic, immemorial time in which the ethical relation happens/ed. The trace of God in the face of the 
other is what triggers every movement that, in a phenomenological description, Levinas shows to be 
subjectivity. The “surplus of truth over being and over its idea, which we suggest by the metaphor of the 
curvature of intersubjective space, signifies the divine intention of all truth. This curvature of s pace is, 
perhaps, the very presence of God.” (T&I, 291) 
 Is this kind of writing properly philosophy or theology? Yes. Levinas, despite his protestations 
that he keeps them separate, the face and the trace will not co-operate with him. In one academic interview 
he is firm with his interlocutor, saying, ‘Now hold on now we’re getting into theology!’ Just before this 
point in the dialogue, however, in speaking of the ‘real presence of God’, he has said: “It is not a metaphor; 
it not only extremely important, it is literally true. I’m not saying that the other is God, but that in his or her 
face I hear the Word of God… (the face) is not mediation – it is the way the word of God reverberates.” 
(Philosophy, Justice, and Love: en, 110) 
 Ethics must now describe a hospitality so hyperbolic and so necessary that it outshines the borders 
and strictures of disciplines. The limits of philosophy, theology, and quite frankly, poetry are destabilized 
by the force of this imperative and by the mystery of the fleeting yet in contestable presence of the trace of 
God. 
That this trace creates me out of the height and the humility of the other person’s face convinces 
me that it is important to attend to and do justice to both, to both the height and humility. 
 Christianity, on the model of charity, seems to overly administer to the humility and destitution of 
refugees. The most-high, the one not available to consumption or narrativization, seems transgressed. Only 
the height of the other can teach me, add to me what was not previously there (if I am quiet enough to 
learn). In still other words, many manifestations of Christianity do not honour the irreducible distance 
between the same and the other: 
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 So many styles of Christianity offer a kind of transport that is rapturous and melty. Jesus, whom to 
know we must surrender and be like little children, envelops worshippers, taking them beyond their own 
power and liberty. Distance is blown away by fusion. This destruction of separation “annuls links between 
persons by making beings participate, albeit ecstatically, in a drama not brought about willingly by them.” 
(A Religion for Adults:  DF, 14) Ultimately, the Christian conception of God is radically different than in 
Levinas, in that for the former, God is conceived of as a being. As Being. And so this religion “makes of 
itself the entry into the kingdom of the absolute.” (T, 16) For Levinas, God is and is only in the ethical 
relation. We inaugurate the kingdom in our proximity. It is perilously easy to lose track of the distinction. 
Confusion is further invited by how the ethical relation does indeed occupy the whole psyche, how it 
extends to structure all relations, and so yes, is omnipresent. But though the ethical relation can be 
reconciled to the God of my childhood, they cannot be conflated. (At any rate, matters of faith are 
individual and private and are not addressed whatsoever by Levinas, thus falling far outside the bounds of 
this paper.) Suffice to say, Christianity tends to compromise the height of the other, and to mediate the 
radical distance between beings; it tends quite simply to make too much noise.  
 
Whereas 
 Marxian-inspired ways of seeing and acting seem to neglect the humility or need of refugees. The 
height of the other – not manifested as awe-before-the-mystery, but as respect for the other’s autonomy – 
seems to have inspired a relation overly based in symmetry and as such transgresses the unconditionality of 
responsibility. It has forgotten that the obsession of the hostage is “the condition for all solidarity” (OTB, 
117), and jumps straight to the solidarity. As a hostage specifically incarnated as privileged in this era and 
geopolitical location, I am of a demographic that permits me, that commands me, to give charity and 
administer to destitution.  
 
 Happily, reality is not a binary opposition. Both ethics do very well on many counts, and both far 
surpass a perverted and degraded liberalism that obviously has no serious interest in assisting refugees. 
From Christianity refugees gain charity, and helpers who take it so seriously that they perform acts of real, 
gratuitous love. From Marx, refugees gain helpers who intervene less, who honour their capacities more, 
and before whom there is room for the self-respect that can result from seeing the structural nature of the 
injustice that has degraded your life. 
Both ethics understand well that the primary responsibility is “for the oppressed who is other than 
myself” (OTB, 55), because upon judgment, upon analysis, they both unequivocally state in their ‘saids’ 
that justice must be done toward those most tormented and broken by injustice. There is a necessary 
privileging of the destitute one in both, albeit with Christianity it can be patronizing and emotional, and 
with Marxism, strident and epistemological. But refugees arriving in our shattered culture would find it 
immeasurably more hostile in the absence of either. 
 And from Levinas refugees could gain helpers who have an intelligence and a type of attention 
whose goal is not to narrativize or thematize. But how do we reflect the wisdom of love in action? How to 
make manifest the understanding, for example, that Desire has no correlate, or that the subject-object 
structure will never produce more humane results than it did in the twentieth century? We must guard a 
silent space – like the eye of a hurricane of conflicting discourses, passions and necessities – a space that 
we admit once and for all can only be named by an abuse of language and by a betrayal of alterity. We 
must build a world that in which the possibility for occasions of betrayal is diminished.  
All this being more responsible than the others is not a matter of feelings, even less so is it to be 
confused with being the ‘wretch’ tortured by the guilt of original sin associated with a certain unfortunate 
Chris tianity. It is a matter of transforming the structure of one’s life. Mary Jo Leddy admits that moments 
of spiritual revelation are not that rare, but that what is is the choice to found one’s life on such insights. 
(RG, 143) The same can be said for philosophical insights, and the challenge of rooting behaviour in 
understanding. Especially if the insight is not an ‘understanding’: “To understand a tool is not to see it, but 
to know how to use it; to understand our situation in reality is not to define it, but to be in an affective 
state.” (Is Ontology Fundamental? : en, 3) And just as Mary Jo Leddy sees gratitude as a force to heal our 
society, Levinas tries to describe the uncanny situation whereby human beings are “able to be thankful for 
the very fact of f inding themselves able to thank; the present gratitude is grafted onto itself as onto an 
already antecedent gratitude.” (OTB, 10) A strange and basic affective state.   
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In my case, this affective state causes me to help create ambits where refugees can re-create their 
lives, rediscover their strength, and access a sense of having a story to tell that cannot be hijacked by 
anyone. It also means working to build a community that invites them to tell it on their own terms.  
Part of that work is developing ways to articulate what we are: wholly created in a glorious and 
rigorously demanding structure that defies formal logic, created by a God infinite in mercy but increasingly 
impatient with our lazy and cowardly predilection for encapsulating one another in narrative. This affective 
state calls me to devote myself to a “world which no longer represses my desire continually to give the 
world to you” (Horowitz, 26), and to invoke it now, in this patient present. 
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Appendix I – or, the Heart 
 
A Call To Conscience 
 
A Statement on Refugees from Faith Communities of Canada 
June 27, 1995 
 
Memories serve us well when they present us with the possibility of making choices and 
commitments that will make a difference now and in the future.  This spring we marked the 
fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War.  We continue to remember how many 
lives were destroyed or diminished by a conflagration fueled by hatred and racism.  This is a 
time to recommit ourselves as a nation to the values of freedom, tolerance and justice. 
 
It was only after the war that we as Canadians slowly realized that while we were engaged in 
fighting a racist nationalism in Europe and the far east, we were engaging in our own forms of 
racism here at home.  We became more aware we had treated certain grounds with callous 
injustice. 
 
In the book None Is Too Many, historians Irving Abella and Harold Troper documented how 
Canada had the worst record in the western world in accepting Jewish refugees.  Many 
Canadians were shocked to hear this as we hold an image of ourselves as a tolerant and 
generous people.  Nevertheless, it is true that a senior civil servant when asked by a reporter 
about the number of Jewish refugees Canada would accept, replied saying “none is too many”.  
That policy was effectively implemented because politicians pandered to racist groups in the 
country, because the vast majority of the population did not know and did not seek to find out 
the truth of the refugee situation and because many official church bodies did not make a 
vigorous effort to speak out. 
 
We will not let this happen again.  We believe it is now our moral duty to speak about the 
reality of Canada’s treatment of refugees.  We know this reality because of the people in our 
respective communities who are working closely with refugees.  Like them, we are worried 
that “none is too many” could become the operative policy within Immigration Canada today.  
We will not let this happen. 
 
We are profoundly concerned about the situation of refugees who have come to  our country 
because their lives are at risk.  Most of these people are decent, often courageous human 
beings who were forced to leave everything that they had, everything that they were, because 
of their political convictions, their religious beliefs or their membership in a certain social 
group.  Under the “Geneva Convention” and other international covenants, we as Canadians 
have bound ourselves to offering protection to these people.  This commitment is a measure 
of our decency as a country. 
 
Unfortunately, these people are being scapegoated for many of the profound social and 
economic problems in our country.  In the media, refugees are often portrayed as criminals or 
potential criminals, as welfare frauds, as gate crashers etc.  No doubt there are some people 
who have no right to claim refugees status but the vast majority of them are people who ask 
only for a second chance at life. 
 
As people who have been shaped by the biblical tradition, we are called to welcome the 
stranger as we would welcome God in our midst.  We reject attempts to portray refugees as 
problems rather than as people who bring great promise to our country.  It is morally wrong 
to make scapegoats of these people.  As a nation we have begun to feel very insecure about 
our national boundaries.  However, it is wrong to think that those boundaries are threatened 
by the relatively small number of people who enter our country seeing refuge.  Our boundaries 
have been and are being erased by vast transnational economic forces, by freer trade, by 
global communications. 
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It is tragic that while we are opening our borders for business, we are closing them to 
desperate people. We are profoundly disturbed by rumours of our government’s plan to shut 
out refugees who arrive at our border via the United States.  Our estimation is that any such 
policy would drastically reduce the number of refugees who could find safety in Canada. 
 
We are often told, and then we think, that we have a generous and accepting refugee policy.  
In fact, ours  is a rather modest effort.  Compared with most countries in the world we accept a 
pitifully small number of people (less than half of one per cent of the world refugee 
population).  The vast majority of refugees are welcomed and sustained by countries in the 
“two thirds world”.  It is almost impossible for refugees who are in danger of their lives to get 
a visa from a Canadian immigration officer overseas. 
 
We also have in our communities people who work for Immigration Canada.  We know most of them are 
decent people. We also know they are overworked and are often frustrated by conflicting and changing 
directives.  However, our concern is that the financial resources of Immigration are increasingly directed to 
keeping certain people out instead of offering protection to genuine refugees. 
 
We are particularly concerned about the “head tax” which was recently placed on refugees.  
Most refugees had to spend all their resources just to get to Canada.  The cost of attaining 
landed immigrant status is virtually impossible for most of them.  This makes it impossible for 
them to sponsor spouses and/or children who may be in situations of great danger.  It also 
makes it very difficult for them to begin any serious job training program. 
 
Let us reach out in mercy.  Let us help these people stand on their own two feet.  Let us not 
stand by and watch while they stoop and bend under the burden of the head tax. 
 
We believe that we as Canadians have been, can be, much better than this.  Even in difficult 
economic times, most Canadians know there is a difference between being out of a job and 
out of a life. 
 
Never again. 
 
We now commit ourselves to engaging in an extensive process of education within our 
communities regarding the real situation of refugees.  We believe that mo st of our people will 
be shocked and moved by information regarding the distress of refugees in Canada. 
 
We commit ourselves to supporting and working with other faith communities whose members 
can feel extremely vulnerable at such a time. 
 
The Second World War happened, in part, because not enough ordinary people spoke out 
against the racism and intolerance which was developing in the 1930’s.  Never again. 
 
We will speak and act on behalf of those whose lives and human rights are threatened at this 
time.  We owe this to those who lost their lives.  We owe it to ourselves and to future 
generations – to become a nation we can hope in. 
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THE GUEST HOUSE 
 
This being human is a guest house. 
Every morning a new arrival. 
 
A joy, a depression, a meanness, 
some momentary awareness comes  
as an unexpected visitor. 
 
Welcome and entertain them all! 
Even if they’re a crowd of sorrows, 
who violently sweep your house 
empty of its furniture, 
still, treat each guest honorably. 
He may be clearing you out 
for some new delight. 
 
The dark thought, the shame, the malice, 
meet them at the door laughing, 
and invite them in. 
 
Be grateful for whoever comes, 
because each has been sent 
as a guide from beyond. 
 
RUMI 
 
 
 
THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD 
 
We have called You names. 
We have cut you down 
       to our smaller size. 
We cannot bear not knowing 
       who You are. 
We cannot stand not knowing 
       what you will do next. 
We, the managers of grace  
in the administration of life. 
How blessed we are 
that You are more 
        than what we make of You 
that You do not fit 
that You are so inconvenient 
        so lacking in good form 
        so impertinent to call. 
O Fire in the ice 
O Stillness in the stream 
O Flowers filling out the sky 
O Love beneath the ground 
O Life within the tomb. 
 
MARY JO LEDDY 
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TELLING STORIES: 
 
NARRATIVE     AND     ARTS     PRACTICES     WITH     REFUGEES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHORUS: It is dreadful, stranger, 
to reawaken a bad thing long laid to 
rest. All the same I am longing to 
know… 
 
OEDIPUS: What is this? 
 
CHORUS: …about that awful pain, 
irresistibly appearing, that you 
became embroiled in. 
 
OEDIPUS: In the name of your 
hospitality, don’t ruthlessly open 
up what I suffered. 
 
CHORUS: There is a widespread 
and constant rumour, and I ask, 
stranger, to hear it truly told…  
 
OEDIPUS: I suffered the worst 
things, strangers, I endured them 
even willingly, let the gods be 
witness. But none of these things 
were my own choice… 
 
Oedipus at Colonus 
Sophocles  
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The very first thing required of refugees upo n arrival in Canada is a narrative explanation of what 
brought them here. They must (remember! and) drag themselves through the very detailed story demanded 
by the Personal Information Form, which is the cornerstone of the application process; if it’s unconvincing, 
there really is no chance of staying here. There are lawyers, and psychologists, assessments from whom are 
required by the lawyers, and of course doctors and counselors… Then there are the optional tellings, for 
example to the volunteer with whom they’ve been matched in any of the multitude of befriending 
programmes, or to the curious face of a sympathetic civil society hungry for models of resilience and for 
evidence that Life is, in fact, Beautiful.   
Already on the scene are arts practitioners of several different bents. Performance art therapists, 
folks preparing testamentary film and video presentations, and facilitators of performance collectives that 
create popular theatre for public education have ‘infiltrated’ refugee settlement services as either 
programmatic or supplementary elements, all over the world! And certainly in Toronto. The author of the 
present discussion is counted among them. All such activities are built on one foundation: the 
autobiographical accounts given by refugees. 
 A taxonomy of the variables that influence, limit and sometimes distort these accounts is 
impossible. Any demographic is heterogeneous, thus no one refugee is representative of, or has situations 
or characteristics in common with, all the others. Among the factors that complicate self-representation is 
the risk associated with disclosure: many active cases involve information that can endanger people. 
Identity, whereabouts, route of escape and political affiliations are all volatile details that may expose the 
claimant or others to terrible consequences, in the countries of origin or of settlement. Exacerbating this 
risk is the obvious fact that for PIF preparations and trials, the translators provided are from the refugees’ 
own ‘ethnic communities’ here in Canada. Relatedly, with artistic enterprises, participants know that 
whatever they create will be seen by a public or semi-public, by people they do not know or know very 
well.  
Another factor is the probability that the arts practitioner will be regarded as a member of the 
dominant society. The repercussions of this are manifold: many refugees distrust authorities, state or 
otherwise. Alternatively, this perception can result in a desire to impress or an exaggerated sense of the 
practitioner’s power to facilitate their refugee claim, in any case modifying the story.  
All people who hear the personal account of a refugee must learn to listen to someone whom they 
know to be telling them what they want to hear, or who doesn’t want to distress them, or who has 
assumptions about what is expected or appropriate for inclusion in a biographical story. (Simon, WPP, 4)6 
At any rate, what the listener gets to hear is entirely up to the individual.   
Most importantly, the stories shared by refugees can come out haltingly, partially or not at all 
because of the sheer pain of confession and the likelihood of some form of retraumatization triggered by 
disclosure. All the anthropologists and academics of the world cannot complicate the number one symptom 
of post-traumatic stress disorder, the most commonly reported feeling in any study of traumatized refugees: 
sadness. Of course most people feel better when they share this feeling with another person. Yet this basic 
generalization so readily lends itself to paternalism, so often is placed at the service of maintaining 
hegemony, so easily is used to exploit the sad. 
The interpersonal dynamics that obtain in arts practices are vulnerable to all of the above 
perversions. The very notion of what constitutes ‘art’, and the entire field predicated on the belief that the 
production thereof could be ‘healing’, are inherently ethnocentric. There are ways of mediating and 
adjusting this optic through new forms and protocols based on self-reflexive vigilance and critical 
awareness. But a mo re fundamental ethical re-orientation needs to occur for the field to deal with its 
problems, for they ultimately stem from one root.  
When the methods and/or productions of artistic work with refugees ‘feel wrong’, over and over 
the liability can be located in narrative. Most artistic customs as framed by ‘our’ heritage demand (or at 
least lend themselves to) over-narrativization of biographical stories. Representations of life events and 
how they were experienced by people are over-determined by conceptual structures that tend to 
overemphasize their coherence and linearity. This movement amounts to a collapsing of alterity.      
The re-orientation needed is primarily played out at the level of attention: how practitioners and 
‘audiences’ of all kinds attend to the testimonial accounts of refugees will either leave room for the 
                                                
6 Abbreviations for essays by Roger Simon: WPP= “What Happens When We Press Play?: Future Research 
on the Substance and Use of Holocaust Audiovisual Testimony”, RaP= “Remembrance as Praxis and the 
Ethics of the Inter-Human”. Texts from Section One that reappear here do so with the same abbreviations. 
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unknown, or enact a grasping movement of comprehension. I am not alone in asking questions that address 
this issue explicitly. The ethics of narrative and of witnessing, new thinking around testimony, public 
memory and self-representation: all this is a growing (almost fashionable) field, developing in particular 
out of the work of those thinkers and practitioners who take seriously a constellation of ideas around 
phenomenology, ethics , and deconstruction. In my research, the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida have been especially fecund. What follows is a small discussion of what they offer to those of us 
who have experienced the value and worth in telling life stories, we who are not quite willing to dismiss 
arts practices as helpful to refugees. 
This unwillingness, and the ethical reconsideration it demands, will here be discussed in two 
related ambits. The first is that of the creative process: the rehearsal floors, classrooms, and church 
basements where people prepare work to show to other people. The second, which will be explored in 
greater depth, deals with the presence of an audience. 
The process of creating a piece of theatre or a video within and/or for the settlement community, 
or for public education, tends to be collective to a greater or lesser extent. Often, and certainly in all my 
experience, collective methods draw on and implicate first-person biographical experience of the 
participants (and, ideally, of the director/facilitator; this idea must be put aside for a later discussion). 
Inevitably, this process involves anecdotal or more protracted disclosure, clarification, and figuring out 
how to present or represent the stories; whether and how much to fictionalize them or juxtapose them, 
among countless others, are decisions made collectively. This risky process can be immensely healing or 
profoundly damaging and re-traumatizing.  
To increase the likelihood of the former happening, participants must mutually understand and 
address as transparently as possible how these processes differ from psychotherapy or any formal therapy 
or counseling. Obviously, the artists and volunteers facilitating such projects are untrained as therapists, 
and as such have a responsibility not to engage in dynamics beyond their capacity. Just as obviously, 
however, the understanding of what constitutes such a dynamic is subjective and not at all regulated. 
The informality of these processes means that in general, moments of healing, discovery and 
integration will be spontaneous and incidental. Perhaps the most salient difference from formal therapy is 
that no outcome around healing per se is envisioned or articulated; outcomes are stated only in terms of the 
piece of art at hand. But the work works on the participants beyond the stated goal of the project. For 
example, one might have a revelation while quietly painting a puppet; one might learn how to trust others 
more as a byproduct of a healthy collective ambit.  
Movements of healing are the most observable in contexts of giving and receiving biographical 
stories. These are exactly the contexts, moreover, where commonly held beliefs about therapy tend to 
influence and guide attitudes and behaviours the most. Far from wishing to eradicate them, an ethical 
reorientation of arts practices would call for a thoughtful and careful consideration of these beliefs. 
Judith Herman M.D. wrote Trauma and Recovery , subtitled The aftermath of violence – from 
domestic abuse to political terror, in 1992. This far-reaching classic has much to offer anyone working 
with traumatized individuals. She rigorously explores the notions underwriting the value of disclosure, 
treating as a given that “the fundamental premise of the psychotherapeutic work is a belief in the restorative 
power of truth-telling.” (Herman, 181) 
 The most critical quality that must be restored to a consciousness fragmented by trauma is that of 
integrity. The parts of a psyche and the facets of a life, in a therapeutic process, will go in the d irection of 
being integrated together, free of the schisms of denial and forgetting. Integrity, as a reconciliation with 
finitude, has also to do with restoring temporal integrity. Both memory and imagination can be severely 
compromised by a trauma that arrests the flow of history: if the past and the future are too hard to bear 
thinking about, people can be reduced to living in an endless present. (T, 89)  
Remembering and disclosing can also help to re-build a foundation for trust. “The interlocking of 
integrity and trust in caretaking relationships… regenerates the sense of human community which trauma 
destroys.” (T, 154) In the interest of both integrity and trust, the text explores methods that “use the 
structure of the narrative to foster an intense reliving experience within the context of a safe relationship.” 
(T, 183)  
Of all the beliefs about therapy, none is more salient than the fantasy of the relation between 
trauma and catharsis. Uncritically accepted by most, and generalized in multifarious ways throughout 
‘western’ culture, the belief is that simply telling is always healing, almost like a magical exorcism. Though 
it most certainly is not, much of the spirit of all these beliefs about therapy will obtain within artistic 
enterprises. 
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Art can mediate and avoid many of the problems associated with disclosure. Art operates in a 
direction other than ‘simply telling’ and especially other than ‘reliving’ (an extremely contestable notion 
when considered anywhere outside formal therapy – even perhaps within it). Artistic expression can shock 
us with deeper levels of awareness than we knew we possessed. It has the capacity to embody simultaneous 
polarities, paradox, and the “ability to hold mixed feelings” (Fox, 78) not often found in ordinary language. 
Dealing with several levels of experience at the same time might enable one to draw novel and useful 
connections among them. 
Making art is a way to meditate on issues without striving for closure or answers. John Fox – 
author of Poetic Medicine, a book repres entative of a certain ‘new-agey’ manifestation of this discourse – 
says of poetry that it is a vehicle for questioning, repeated questioning that does not attain or even reach for 
solutions. The insight it offers is like that of a koan: the conceptual or e motional movement or progress is 
found in the way you circle around it to see many angles. And, like a koan, poetry “enfolds us in meaning 
but do(es) not insist on logic.” (T, 205) It surprises with unexpected flashes of peace or delight, with 
phrasings that arrest and reorient the heart, and opens the possibility of uttering monumental things, when 
straight description “seems to crack under the pressure of deep feeling.” (T, 195) 
Thus making art invites a certain unblocking of the consciousness; a catharsis abstracted can still 
give an individual a way in to memories. One individual reflected on writing a poem in a workshop by Fox: 
“There is much I can’t feel about those years and this gives me a place to start.” (T, 187, my emphasis) 
Finally, creative processes can clarify perceptions and galvanize agency, by distilling experience into 
images, sounds or movements that express what something is or was like, for you. This simple affirmation 
of unicity can have a radical impact on the self-confidence of some. 
The political economy and cultural landscape underwriting Fox’s feel-good book, however, betray 
a brutal (one longs to be able to use the word bourgeois) myopia. He continuously insists that we ‘reclaim’ 
voices, feelings, and ‘truths’, by ‘capturing’ moments in art. But this mantra calling us to reclaim renders 
invisible the moment of loss and wounding; it never addresses the theft of what now must be reclaimed in 
any political way. The trauma and abuse to which people have ‘lost’ parts of the self are not forces of 
nature, unfortunate and inevitable, like a hurricane. They are the results of actions, which have authors, and 
which – especially in the case of refugees – can only be named and understood as part of a political 
structure.   
 Fox’s text makes much of the ‘interior place’ that all possess, coextensive with an “essential 
character and original nature of who we are”... and unchanging core that must be “reclaimed... returned to” 
(T, 11) Everywhere in this kind of discourse we hear that our ‘essential nature’ is to be ‘whole’. This 
essentializing attitude presupposes a stable interiority, as though it were possible to ‘remember and recount’ 
the ‘facts’ of one’s life. Thus in the preface we are told that poetry is “simply speaking truth”. Which truth, 
whose truth, and how and why this speaking is being performed is absent from the discourse. This absence 
obliterates creative agency; the poem or the story is not who someone is, any more than any creation is its 
author. 
Not only is there no such stable interiority, but I am not ‘whole’. I am not whole without the other 
and all the other’s others; I am in community, neither self-identical nor self-contained. To posit people as 
whole was only ever to speak to the individual of the enlightenment living in a capitalist society. Though 
Fox says some lovely things about poetry, to responsibly inherit the wisdom of the genre he represents is to 
be critical of it.  
I was working last month at the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture, where I have been a 
volunteer for about five years. I was putting together a display for a big event at Metro Hall, a good 
opportunity for public education. On the floor of a tiny office, I was arranging several harrowing images of 
torture. I was being extremely critical; I couldn’t make a spectacle out of them, no, and they definitely had 
to be tactful and understated, had to make the viewer do most of the work... My daydreaming, here, is not. 
The noise in my head is more like sustained interrogation, thinking of the paper I’m writing vis-à-vis this 
display, and exactly what is this Metro Hall thing for anyway? An opportunity to righteously spread the 
word that Life is not Beautiful. Had I checked my body I would have found it contracted, my forehead 
harsh and grooved. My vigilance, here, is not. It’s more like anger, as if all the settlement services in this 
city were ethical debacles, abusive and totalizing...  
 
 I am interrupted by the sound coming from the ESL classroom next door, by the voices of people 
who have lived the experiences I am so wary of representing in my little display; displaced Kurds, Somalis, 
Afghanis and Rwandans, whose shattered and wobbly bodies drag them here on weekday afternoons, to 
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learn this alphabet together, sometimes in the same class as enemies from home. They are singing You Are 
my Sunshine. Practicing-English-Singing. One of the voices – an old man’s – slightly out of tune and the 
most confident, rises above the others. The English is hilarious. They swell with enthusiasm near the end, 
imperfect and giggling, imploring you please not to take their sunshine away.  
 
What a fool I am. I sit, gluestick in hand, wondering who in hell I think I am to take feel-good 
Hollywood movies away from those who clearly appreciate them, suddenly weeping fat and unacademic 
tears. I feel not like a ‘witness’ (in all the complexity that introduces) to this, but rather like a rabbit, caught 
in the headlights, frozen and quaking before possible responses, made still by a rib-cracking love. 
 
Not all settlement services are misguided, and none are totally misguided. This happy fact is the 
logical result of people working together, living together, doing things together every day. We do all these 
things imperfectly, but over long periods of time; we build ambits where people get used to each other, and 
inevitably encounter one another as real individuals. In the encounter, “you learn each other’s names and 
begin to hear each other’s stories. This is the reach of mercy and within it the desire for justice is borne.” 
(BcH, 5) The last word in that quotation can be taken with or without the ‘e’. A further resonance: we can 
only ever begin to hear one another’s stories.   
Perhaps the best ethics had the chance to breathe as we learned each other’s names. Derrida asks, 
“If the proper name does not belong to language, to the ordinary functioning of language7... what 
consequences can we draw from this about hospitality?” (OH, 137)8 In harmony with Levinas, we can 
describe an address to the other as an invocation: I cannot name the other without it being a greeting; I 
cannot meet the other without simultaneously somehow expressing this meeting. A proper name has 
already sidestepped the reification and objectification that can only be in language. So has a liability been 
identified in language itself? What are we doing with language? 
 The stories refugees tell are made of language, which has both a narrow and broad sense. (OH, 
133) The narrow sense (as in English or Shona) brings its own problematics, which must be negotiated in 
all these largely English-language artistic productions made with refugees to Canada.9  
But in the broad sense, how it has been disenchanted and drained of sincerity and 
straightforwardness! After desiccating millennia in the light of ontology, and all that time deployed in the 
service of domination, deceit, and cynicism, of the more general cultural climate of contempt that hijacks 
meaningful language (note the recent monstrous perversion of the signifier ‘freedom’) and scrambles our 
lexicon... 
After all that, language itself has become suspect in a process related and parallel to the last 
century’s degradation and dubious scrutiny of the ‘subject’. As though a contamination needed to be 
overcome in the utterances of a subject liable to have been tricked by hallucination, opinion and ideology. 
As though the only true vocation of the subject were the articulation of Being, the calling forth of Being 
into objectified and thematized consciousness.  
 It’s true that a subject’s knowledge is partial, discursive and contingent on shifting grounds. It is 
true that our very alphabet is poisoned by violence, a violence so inhumane and systematic that we can no 
longer deny the existence of a “radical lie at the very beginning of speech.” (OH, 122) To say ‘language is 
limited’ is also true, but the meaning and significance of this statement has been ill conceived by almost 
everyone.    
Carolyn Forché, in her contribution to The Poet’s Notebook , affirms language’s vast capacities, 
stating that representations of any story demand “thick des criptions” (PN, 38) of their dynamics and 
implications. This may be hard work, but it is “primitive” to say that language does not express anything 
that can manifest to consciousness. Conscious thought IS linguistically structured. Language can capture 
everything that can be captured; it is the very essence of capturing. Levinas agrees, admitting the inability 
either to avoid using language, or to shelter it from ontological abuse. Rather, an ever-present risk of abuse 
is the price that manifestation exacts. Thought does not first ‘perceive’ data and then make sense of them 
linguistically; rhetoric “seems part of the intellectual act, and to be the very intrigue in which a this-as-that 
is assembled.” (Levinas, Everyday Language and Rhetoric without Eloquence: Outside the Subject, 136) 
                                                
7 For example, it cannot be translated. ‘Jacques’ is not ‘Jack’ in the same way un anchois is an anchovy. 
8 Abbreviations for texts by Jacques Derrida: OH= Of Hospitality, HJR= Hospitality, Justice and 
Responsibility, EW= Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject  
9 What I had intended to spend all of graduate school studying has been reduced, as it were, to a footnote. 
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And rhetoric, eloquence, and artistic language – to a greater or lesser extent – narrativizes. Is it possible, 
either through ‘everyday language’ or otherwise, to lessen the extent? “Narrative – and, consequently, 
verbal, linguistic – intentionality is essential to thought, inasmuch as thought is thematization and 
identification.” (Levinas, Language and Proximity: CPP, 110) But only inasmuch. All that sticks out of 
thematization is, indeed, the singular theme of my meditation. 
Forché discusses the ethical dimensions of a witnessing situation, and the impossibility of 
‘knowing’ the other’s pain, due to the inadequacy not of language but of the concept of ‘knowing’. Stories 
that involve trauma, as they almost always do in the case o f refugees, are very difficult for the teller and the 
listener. Out of avoidance of this pain comes the notion of the ‘ineffable’, or the ‘unspeakable’, words 
people use as if language were far less potent than it is. “We have made unspeakable mean indescribable. It 
really means ‘nasty’” (PN, 41) Though nastiness can be ambiguous, highly specific, and contradictory, it 
can be named. Some things are hard to express but really, very little is beyond language. 
What very little that escapes the story, that which is non-thematizable, has tremendous 
consequences for our reconsideration of storytelling. It is only by the meta-linguistic remainder that we 
understand the inadequacy of the concept of ‘knowing’ another’s pain. 
Emmanuel Levinas broke with all of western philosophy by a unparalleled deployment of the 
phenomenological reduction. His initial interruption questioned the notion of absolute adequation in 
intuition and intention. That is to say, the consciousness of the Same had been able to find outside, a 
seamlessly complete and perfect mirror of what was inside. Levinas disrupted this egoistic recuperation, 
this collapse of alterity, by making phenomenology able to (and so forcing it to) think the Other. 
“Consciousness does not consist in equaling being with representation… but rather in overflowing 
this play of lights – this phenomenology – and in accomplishing events whose ultimate signification 
(contrary to the Heideggerian conception) does not lie in disclosing.” (T&I, 27, his emphasis) If 
subjectivity is conceived beginning with the ethical relation, intelligibility (the illumination of the ‘play of 
lights’) is not the ultimate event of being. The discovery of being’s ‘truth’ is not the destination of what 
goes/went on in the ethical relation. “The welcoming of the face and the work of justice – which condition 
the birth of truth itself – are not interpretable in terms of disclosure.” (T&I, 28) 
Ontology can no longer ignore the face that disrupts the totality. As the very origin of language, 
the approach of the other and the communication thereof is not a work but a greeting… “The essential 
condition for prepositional truth is not in the disclosure of a being… but the expression of an interlocutor to 
whom I tell both the being he is and the being of his being.” (Levinas, The Ego and the Totality: CPP, 43) 
The following section makes me wish this essay were a painting, for a need to overlay and 
sometimes conflate two understandings of the word ‘testimony’. They need to be held together – like an 
egg in each palm – and whenever it’s clear that a passage intends it in the one sense, the palimpsest of the 
other will be there. Levinas says that the truth of testimony is certainly irreplaceable insofar as the subject 
is its “‘experiences’, the enclosed and private domain that opens itself to universality and inspection only 
through the story that the subject makes of these.” (Truth of Disclosure and Truth of Testimony : Basic 
Philosophical Writings, 100) But he goes on to explore how it is much more and far more fundamental 
even than this. 
The concept ‘testimony’ is enjoying a very popular moment; it is ‘given’ as a fruitful method in 
therapeutic work with refugees all over the world. “In the telling, the trauma story becomes a testimony. 
Inger Agger and Soren Jensen, in their work with refugee survivors of political persecution, note the 
universality of testimony as a ritual of healing. Testimony has both a private dimension, which is 
confessional and spiritual, and a public aspect, which is political and judicial…” (Herman, 181) In the 
expanding into the larger public dimension, the trauma story becomes a “ ‘new story,’ which is ‘no longer 
about shame and humiliation’, but rather ‘about dignity and virtue’. Through their storytelling, his refugee 
patients ‘regain the world they have lost.’” (Herman, 181) 
 Of all this, Levinas asks if we could not propose “a role for testimony – and for the Saying itself – 
that would be more directly ‘veritative’ than that which they play when transmitting or communicating 
ontological experiences?” (T, 101) He is suggesting that testimony is the origin of a kind of meaning that 
signifies other than to signify being, and that sensibility can be thought outside the limits of being.   
 Of course, in the above quotation, he is talking about speech in general. But could his question not 
apply to testimony as understood in the field of refugee issues, privileging the telling over the content? 
Could the ‘world’ one has ‘lost’ be restored in the event of communication – in the ethical relation? Ye s, 
but... not so fast. 
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 Levinas describes the psychism “as a relation with the unrepresentable, as a relation with a past on 
the hither side of every present and every representation, not belonging to the order of presence... The 
freedom of the other will never have been able to originate in my own, that is to say, will never have been 
able to fit into the same present... (or) contemporary with my freedom, or be representable to me.” (T, 101) 
Since we do not inhabit the same plane, or the same present, we must not rush to ‘restore’, for we must not 
believe that we have grasped what was lost. We must not think that we have crossed the distance that holds 
the other away from and above me in inviolable alterity. Awareness of unrepresentability is precisely the 
corrective needed by those who would consume or exploit the testimonies of refugees. But how far can or 
must this be taken? 
  Jacques Derrida provides conceptual tools with which to negotiate my inheritance of Levinas’ 
ideas. Deconstruction’s cornerstone idea of ‘undecidability’ does not indicate postponement or paralysis, 
but rather the gravity of responsibility, and the depth of our interdependence. “For a decision to be a 
decision, it must be made by the other in myself, which doesn’t exonerate me from responsibility.” (HJR, 
67) This responsibility drives me to make decisions in radical passivity (and learning how to explain that 
this is not a paradox is my singular goal). It also instructs me to “filter the heritage... This means that to 
inherit, or to keep memory for a finite being implies some   selection, some choice, some decision.” (HJR, 
67) And what could be more an inheritance than the testimony of survivors of trauma? 
 Speaking as an inheritor of Levinas himself, Derrida places the logic of testimony at the centre of 
the project of deconstruction: “Testimony, which implies faith or promise, governs the entire social space. I 
would say that theoretical knowledge is circumscribed within this testimonial space. It is only by reference 
to the possibility of testimony that deconstruction can begin to ask questions concerning knowledge and 
meaning.” (HJR, 82) The very possibility of iteration and of language begins in consciousness thus 
conceived, as an irreducible relation to the other. Artistic expression proceeds from the same place; Derrida 
casually flings “metaphoricity supposes exappropriation” (EW, 270) in to his discussion of subjectivity. It’s 
true; our ability to make art testifies to what we are, and how that began. 
 Language, then, is hospitality, by the grace of its birthplace in the ethical relation. It is also – even 
in the narrow sense – where the aporia begins. “Must we ask the foreigner to understand us, to speak our 
language, in all the senses of this term... before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our 
country?” (OH, 15) Thought in terms of the ethical relation – unconditional expiation for and duty to the 
absolute other – the answer to this question is NO.  
Yet we inhabit a world full of third parties, a world where justice must be social and political, and 
decisions must be made; a world where hospitality is inscribed in a right. As such, it “presupposes the 
social... status of the contracting parties, that it is possible for them to be called by their names, to have 
names, to be subjects in law, to be questioned and liable...” (OH, 23) By bringing in contractual and 
therefore reciprocal arrangements, we have already departed from the ethical relation.  
A difficult puzzle: on the one hand, there is “unconditional hospitality that dispenses with the law, 
duty, or even politics, and, on the other, hospitality circumscribed by law and duty.” (OH, 135) The two 
realms must be constantly negotiated, as if there were two (undecidable!) regimes of hospitality. In the 
movement between them, as usual, the difference between a refugee-other and the absolutely-other 
becomes extremely slippery. The latter commands me to absolute or just hospitality, which “breaks with 
hospitality by right; not that it condemns or is opposed to it... but it is as strangely heterogeneous to the law 
to which it is yet so close, from which in truth it is indissociable.” (OH, 27) And so the Law requires laws, 
which always threaten to dissimulate and contaminate it from the inside out. 
Derrida wonders whether “hyperbolical, unconditional hospitality doesn’t consist in suspending 
language... and even address to the other.” (OH, 135) Though this is a bit counterintuitive when considered 
alongside what we have said about invocation and the ethical relation, it is  also clear that asking who one is 
and where one comes from speaks only in the name of the juridical, of the state. “Shouldn’t we abstain 
from asking another these questions, which herald so many required conditions, and thus limits” (OH, 135) 
to absolute hospitality? At least this attitude of restraint must be carried through into the political realm. 
 Contrast all this with inquisitive listeners, hungry for disclosure, who feed on details and fetishize 
injury. Such people listen in pedagogical contexts, in settlement services recording PIFs; they are 
volunteers running conversation groups, and actual audiences. The aggression undertaken to dis -cover, the 
impulse to illuminate, and the craving to get full confession manifests all manner of pathologies on the part 
of arts practitioners or audience members. Everything from a pornographic style of voyeurism to 
projections and assumptions that overdetermine the narrative compromise the real-ness of the person and 
inhibit their spontaneity and complexity. If no person is reducible to a representation of his or her 
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biography, however detailed, then still less can someone be reduced to the sum of only her tragic parts. 
What exiled and terrorized them is one story among many refugees might tell about their lives; they were 
not always, nor will they always be, refugees. 
But remembering and memorializing, rescuing memories from the oblivion of forgetting, is 
essential; it is part of what makes imagination possible. As we have seen, art can facilitate this 
remembering. Memory, imagination and art are in a symbiotic relation. 
Art is predicated on imagination, which involves a certain orientation toward a truly open future, 
beyond the binary opposition of the impossible and the possible. Jacques Derrida speaks of l’avenir – the 
future, in French – but it is a venir, it is what is to come . Unlike simply le futur, the a venir cannot be 
anticipated; it is neither extension of nor extrapolation from what exists in this present. It is not just ‘more 
of the same’ at a later time. It will be absolutely surprising. Without this cipher, imagination could never 
be, would have no reason to be, born. Without both memory and imagination, there is no exit from the 
harsh light of the present that subsumes all other moments into a totality. The absolute present is not the 
time of the ethical relation. 
  Happily – and by an amazing grace – the luminous synchrony of the present (whereby this 
moment is identical to itself, is contained in itself) bears a trace of the time of creation. It is not stable. The 
time of the other is a diachrony. The possibility opened by diachrony is the possibility for something to 
arrive. To teach, to shock, to add to my consciousness what was not there before. Not to confirm my 
intuitions but to bring radically strange elements. And to correct my longing for unity, for fusion, for the 
ecstasy that destroys distance: 
Not everything melts and surrenders to my gaze; the other resists and recedes from the light. She 
is not for me to “get” in any sense of the word. The other is NOT ME, not even very much LIKE me, nor a 
player in my endless drama of assimilation. There is an alterity so radical and separate that it cannot join 
me in communion, no matter how cleverly I expand. So we are not one; we are not one… 
 
In the rabbit field I am haunted by Andrej’s worms. Tonight again they are mocking me, their 
genius putting my own into question. Do you know about them? There were these researchers, Andrej told 
me, who found that if you administer triggers followed by electric shocks to one group of worms, and if 
you then grind them up and feed them another group of worms who digest them, well, with the same trigger 
the second group still feel the shock! They vibrate with atomic memory. 
 
But a worm is not the Other. I cannot be the Other to a worm. A worm is not beside itself, both 
worm and not-worm; it does not refuse synchronization. A worm leaves no “trace of an original disaster 
which was not experienced in the first person precisely because it ruined this first person.” (Forché: PN, 37)  
 
Yes, people are different from worms. But rabbits? I cannot say: out of curiosity I take a wriggling 
mouthful. Chew and swallow, and as I exhale, I begin to vibrate. Almost imperceptibly at first, then, 
needing to sit, then, needing to lie down on my back. I stare at the night sky, convulsing as if a freight train 
were thundering around and around my body. 
  
A rabbit must be a pagan. 
 
 In leaning on poetic language this way, it is not my intention to dissimulate my primary questions: 
what does all this have to do with narrative? Am I struggling with ethics vis-à-vis the stories of others or 
my own? Exactly that ambiguity is the heart of learning to do this work out of an ethical orientation. The 
undecidability is coextensive with, or is, the birth of responsibility. 
 By now you are familiar with Levinas’ discussion of Saying and the Said. A transitive Saying, a 
telling, subjects the listener to an intersubjective relation which overflows or exceeds the meaning of what 
is told, in the same way infinity overflows what can be comprehended in the face-to-face relation. Saying is 
betrayed – in every sense of that word – in the Said. Always: ‘Truth’ only appears, radiant and intelligible, 
in the Said. Being cannot be disclosed to consciousness otherwise. There is the gravity and potency of 
language: All truth is in it. In privileging Saying, Levinas is not seeking a world without nouns; the Said is 
not evil! It is necessary for sociality, the only way we can do things like make institutions and artworks and 
plans, it is the throne of truth itself. But are Truth, Being, and Consciousness really all there is to the human 
being? 
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 What Levinas is seeking is to do is to reduce the relation between Saying and the Said, to ask 
totally afresh what the relation teaches us about signification. Relating is not a ‘moment of Being’; 
proximity is not one example among many of ‘stuff people can get into’. Saying – relating in proximity – 
shocks and surprises me, puts me in question, elects me and not someone else to respond, concretely, to be 
infinitely responsible to the other. This election, prior to choice and the freedom/non-freedom binary, is 
more like a seizure than a caress. The elected is not a nice person, but a person per se; the subject, as host, 
is a hostage. 
 What is meant by the words ‘Saying shocks, and puts me in question’? Adam Zachary Newton, in 
his work Narrative Ethics, compares it to the Said: “‘Saying’... tends to exact the profounder price... from 
speaker, from hearer, and from text.” (Newton, 4) The price, I think, is twofold: In one sense, it is the price 
that manifestation always exacts; when Saying is betrayed in the Said, when anything passes into the realm 
of being, there is the ever-present risk of alienation, of perversion, and of reification. The passing of events 
into a story translates a life into a noun. Narrative can be coercive, reductive, and historically recuperative 
(T, 7); barring the signification of Saying, closing down the dynamism of diachronic time, and making it 
synchronic and comprehensible.  
 In another sense, the price of communication is infinite obligation, duty, and responsibility for the 
other in proximity. This calling into account, calling into question, is all the more accusative when the other 
is relating a biographical story, and yet more still when it is a story of trauma, destitution, or persecution. 
The ethical relation implicates narrative “as claim, as risk, as responsibility, as gift, as price.” (T, 7) 
 Newton’s work, dealing with written texts, is literary criticis m that makes its inheritance of 
Levinas explicit. It is fascinating how much of it can be applied to live storytelling events. Most 
importantly, his analysis conceives of a way to take some of the pressure of liability off narrative. So far, 
my discussion has made much of narrative’s tendency to objectify, reify and overdetermine a life. But as 
the site where the entire analysis is actually played out, surely, it is not devoid of merit. Newton imagines 
how the ethical relation might not preclude narrative; the title Narrative Ethics indicates “a logic which 
binds its two parts intrinsically and necessarily.” (T, 8) The relation between the two terms is neither 
contrived nor incidental; rather, he is striving to elaborate “narrative as ethics: the ethical consequences of 
narrating story and fictionalizing person, and the reciprocal claims binding teller, listener, witness and 
reader in the process.” (T, 11) 
 Newton explores the undecidable tension between Saying and the Said. He acknowledges how the 
Said freezes or crystallizes the dynamic event of telling into stasis; how “both life and story are... hostages 
to reiteration, the eternal return of chill, thaw, and chill again.” (T, 4) But the betrayal can be reduced by 
developing a different kind of attention, by attending differently in the approach.  
Newton proposes a more phenomenological approach to written texts, describing the difference 
“between a reading that attempts to evaluate or even solve a text’s problems and one which engages them 
in their concrete, formal, narrative particularity. One faces a text as one might face a person, having to 
confront the claims raised by that very immediacy, an immediacy of contact, not of meaning.” (T, 11) Here 
the relation is privileged over content. This can only be good, as the content of the story must not be 
understood as what or who a person is. People must collapse their lives in order to tell them, and the telling 
is, in a sense, the first breath identity takes. The fact that the teller is directing the construction thereof, is 
absolutely a creative agent, can now take focus. “Above all, as an ethics, narrative is performance or act.” 
(T, 7) 
  Newton takes seriously the grave risks, “both discursive and existential, of telling one’s ‘life -
story’.” (T, 15) The hunger to be recognized and understood, and caught , as in ‘do you catch my 
meaning?’… also leaves one caught as in a cage; the inseparable nature of the two senses brings a profound 
ambivalence for most tellers. How can language be truthful about a self without ‘capturing’, without 
reducing it to a few summary incidents? And without consumption: no one wishes to be ‘gotten’ as a 
reporter ‘gets’ a story. 
 An ethical reconsideration of narrative encounters involves further meditation on these themes of 
attention, of immediacy, and of the performative nature of disclosure. The risks associated with telling can 
be mediated when listeners engage in “learning the paradoxical lesson that “getting” someone else’s story 
is also a way of losing them as real; it is a way of appropriating or allegorizing that endangers both 
intimacy and ethical duty. At the same time, however, one’s responsibility consists of responding to just 
this paradox.” (T, 19) 
The most pressing responsibility facing practitioners in the field of testimonial and witnessing 
practices is that of keeping testimony alive. It must somehow retain its quality of saying, of addressing, in 
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order to make remembrance an active response. This is not a work of representation, but one of something 
happening, now, between the giver(s) and receiver(s). Meanwhile, the demented neo-liberal conception of 
“responsibility”, and the inherent imperialism of the helper ego both encourage a more ‘culturally aware’ 
and ‘sensitive’ society through artistic presentations of true stories of bad things that happened to people(s).  
Fortunately, the Other plays not on my sensitivities but puts me in question; I am suddenly 
ruptured, subject to change, accused. The Other interrupts my self-sufficiency, my identity, my being 
identical to myself. Suddenly, I am not one, I am (at least) two, as the other in me, the Other before me, 
calls me exactly to “the end of safety” as Adrienne Rich puts it. It is only from this place of instability that I 
can receive testimony not as knowledge but as counsel. 
Roger Simon, in his excellent work on testimony, deals principally with remembered accounts of the 
Shoah. He suggests that such a testimonial encounter is diachronic in two ways: in the sense of the ethical 
relation we have been discussing, and in the fact that the speaker is remembering something in her actual 
past. (WPP, 1) 
That survivors of the Shoah are reaching into the very distant past (the few living subjects left to 
him, fast disappearing, are of course recounting childhood memories) brings its own problematics. Its 
emergency echoes a searing line from a poem by R. M. Rilke; ‘We are perhaps the last to have known such 
things.’ From the point of view of this analysis, however, the differences between Simon’s elderly subjects 
and newly arrived refugees are of negligible importance; the ethical relation can structure listening to 
refugee testimony, even in the case of helping a claimant with a PIF who speaks of an event that happened 
as recently as ‘Wednesday’.  
Remembering, in both the long and the short term, is difficult and sad (and for someone with post 
traumatic stress disorder, still scary). In listening, especially in an ambit of presenting or preparing an 
artistic work, it is of vital necessity to be clear about the role of the receivers: Why should there be an 
audience? For the reception to be more than voyeuristic, we must ask how/why this work is valuable and to 
whom. The answers will seldom be simple or comforting. Simon explores them in Remembrance as Praxis 
and the Ethics of the Inter-Human, a work that elaborates the connection between the ethics described 
above and arts-based practices. Simon devotes appropriate attention to the theme of attention, to how to 
attend to a testamentary act. The attention called for is not ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’; rather, to use 
Levinasian terms, it is a passivity beyond any passivity, apriori, pre-reflective, more passive than mere 
‘receptivity’. It is a passivity, again, of being called into question. 
Contrast this with the kind of attention engendered by the media of globalization that generates 
internal fragmentation experienced as ‘too much information’ “with no continuity between perceptions or 
actions.” (RaP, 3) Stories of others’ suffering are presented as just more information. This state of affairs 
can be compared to a nineteenth century form of entertainment called a phantasmagoria, a show created 
with moveable lanterns and painted slides. It conjured what is described in turn as a parade of ghosts, a 
procession of images, and shadows divested of their materiality, which “drew on a variety of gothic 
narratives, literary spectres and mythic images.” (RaP, 5) 
Like the spectacle of official multiculturalism and its ‘visible minorities’, the phantasmagoric 
series of apparitions seeks to create and inscribe collective and cultural memory. Fascinating or frightening, 
yet always somehow disconnected from any lived reality, it is a presentation that outstrips its own content; 
of its audience it asks only for consumption. The presentation of pain and suffering as sheer spectacle 
reduces the experience of ‘being touched’ by a story to one of pure affectivity.  
 ‘Being touched’ is not rightly a matter of mere affect, but a matter of contiguity, of proximity; 
touch “is in fact a metaphor for the impingement of the world as a whole upon subjectivity.” (RaP, 3) 
Impingement: unexpected, confronting me with my originary culpability, guilt before I have done anything. 
It is difficult to name this haunting to which everyone is subject, this ghost who asks me first to swear that I 
have witnessed her. Indeed, the specter, spectrality, is the (only) corrective to the spectacle. Upon analytic 
inspection, I suspect that the specter invoked by Jacques Derrida, the same specter central to Roger 
Simon’s argument, is an aspect of the ‘trace’ discussed by Levinas. Meditations on the ghost and on the 
trace, at any rate, tend to generate a common result: spectacular respect for radical alterity. 
 Consider Derrida’s treatment of Shakespeare’s Hamlet in Specters of Marx. The ghost of Hamlet’s 
father, before appearing, brings first an injunction: SWEAR. Here is the “possibility of developing a 
covenant with a non-present instance.” (RaP, 4) We swear to witness, but what we see can never become 
fully present or manifest. Shakespeare, Derrida and Simon all know how important it is to maintain this 
distance, this non-phenomenality: the ghost in Hamlet wears armour. So as not to be rendered a phantom in 
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the phantasmagoria (where all are manifestly manifest), the ghost also wears a visor in order to see without 
being seen. The ghost is an agent. 
 It is so important to maintain this distance because the relation between me and the other is 
characterized first of all by asymmetry. The stories of others are “stories that seek our attention while 
needing to maintain their distance (that is, a distance that protects the non-phenomenal phenomenon of its 
address from too easily settling into our present/identificatory knowledges).” (RaP, 16) This separation 
enables the other to truly teach me. All this puts the traditional understanding of ‘solidarity’ into question; 
the testamentary/witnessing relation is asymmetrical and thus non-reciprocal . 
 The Marxian notion of solidarity says that ‘my liberation is bound up with yours; none are free 
until all are free, and so I am not driven by compassion but by our shared struggle…’ It’s not that these 
words are not ‘true’. They are true and also inadequate as an ethical orientation. How could I think that I 
could ever give back to God what God gives to me? It is the trace (of God) that brings me counsel. 
 And counsel is what initiates the de-phasing of my ego and also of time  itself. The exposition in 
Hamlet begins, “The time is out of joint…” The schism, the rupture, of this non-coincidence is both an 
opening (in immediacy) to the other, and the announcement of what is not immediate, of diachrony. As 
such it is always an experience of non-indifference, as the hyperbolic language needed to describe it attests 
to. The drama is in the way the trace confronts you with what you are not: it comes “from beyond my 
time… (it is in) ghosts that disjoin the exchange-order of presents.” (RaP, 4)  
Such de-stabilization is always unexpected, and not even recognizable: the Other in his/her alterity 
refuses to be integrated and remains radically exterior. When speaking of such an arrival, it is a tremendous 
leap to suggest that there could be, should be, a welcome . Because it is not yet or still intelligible, how to 
welcome? Derrida instructs us to be unconditionally hospitable before we open the door and see who is on 
the other side: “Let us say YES to who or what turns up... before any identification, whether or not it has to 
do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest or an unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival 
is the citizen of another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or 
female.” (OH, 77) A true welcome demands that we throw off all defenses before knowing – before 
integrating (in every register of that word , up to and especially that used in discourses of refugee issues) – 
who  or what arrives. It requires devotion to a shadow of a hint of a trace of what we have never seen: 
learning, finally, to live with ghosts.  
But we have not yet done the work to get there. Let us return to the phantasmagoria, that negative 
infinity where every past or future moment can be integrated into the present in an endless movement of 
recuperation. Nothing can resist the com-prehension (to grasp everything with one’s hands) of an audience 
thus assembled; nothing is too foreign to be made a part of their experience. The magic lantern show, in 
failing to deal with alterity, fails to deal with justice: 
First, most (multi-) media manifestations fail to deal with the production of the tragedies they 
represent. Political economy is absent from the tearjerkers created in a Hollywood enslaved to the very 
forces that generated the wounds. Oh, Life is Beautiful, we sniff, while using our IBM computers that – the 
company that – invented the system of numbering that regulated the concentration camps. Who answers for 
that? As was asked in the criticism of a poetry that simply “reclaims”: Can healing activities that ignore the 
structural dimension of the wounds ever be effective or even not damaging? 
 If injustice remains unnamed, our privilege goes unacknowledged. People prefer to be moved by 
the Shoah, saying, that’s someone just like me ‘dying in his own excrement (RaP, 7), isn’t that powerful!’ 
But it was not someone like me  in the least. I have never known anything other than the safety of being a 
white North American. 
But one does not have to ‘identify’ with a refugee to be, in obsession, a term in the ethical relation. 
The ethical relation – communication – is an openness of the self. It does not seek resonance. As 
metaphysical desire, it seeks the good in the form of service, of obligation. This openness is “not complete 
if it is on the watch for recognition. It is complete not in opening to the spectacle of or the recognition of 
the other, but in becoming a responsibility for him.” (OTB, 119) 
Second, the phantasmagoria structures attention in a non-public way. The “parade of identical 
phantoms (make a) claim to presence.” (RaP, 4) If something claims to have fully manifested in a 
synchronic present, with no remainder (no trace, no specter to haunt), then it claims that the representation 
is identical to the represented. Thus, the other (the dead one or the testimony of the living one before me) 
does not await my invitation, acceptance or welcome, in order to be complete. The event asks nothing of 
me. My relation with the story is intimate, closed to society and to justice. 
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 An example: One relatively recent night, I watched The Joy Luck Club in French on late-night TV. 
It always makes me cry. There we were: me, and it. And I cried, of course. The film and I formed a 
number; we were two terms in a system. But I and the Other do not form a number; we do not form a 
totality visible from the outside. Now, the totality formed by the film and me is spectacle, which “opens the 
object of my gaze to my individual involvement with it. Not at all pure passivity, the basis of spectacle lies 
in eliciting… a strictly individuated response.” (RaP, 8) 
Justice is absent from such an encounter in that the film “pretends that there is no need to have the 
substance of my attendance re-inscribed in a relational, publicly accountable manner.” (RaP, 8) In other 
words, community is impossible here because there is nothing for me to do but enjoy my weeping that feels 
so private. Indeed there is nothing to do at all before this lightshow that leaves you in ‘fear and trembling’: 
“Before the phantasmagoric scene we fall in awe – feeling deeply, but with nothing to say.” (RaP, 8) The 
Shoah, for example, made aesthetically beautiful or reduced to the sublime confronts us with enormity, 
“making it alien to thought, leaving memory in ruins and reducing us to a stammer.” (RaP, 13) Thus 
‘experienced’, the Shoah cannot be public. The public is the inter-human; justice is the arrival of all the 
third parties, of all the other’s others. Spectacle doesn’t even need me to be there! 
A testamentary address, on the other hand, is unfinished. It requires my response to call it into 
being, and still then it will not be completed: the work of remembrance in the ethical relation is infinitely 
ongoing. Because it is active and transitive, such an address is “situated anew at each testamentary instance 
of public time.” (RaP, 10) Diachronous time is a dynamic of waiting for, of hearing and responding to, an 
imminent trace that always escapes. It is a “non-linear temporality, a momentary complex of the has-been, 
the making-present, and the coming-toward.” (RaP, 10) As with Derrida’s avenir, such surprise is possible 
only in proximity, and its ongoing or infinite nature means that the testamentary act “becomes what it is 
only in being offered to others.” (RaP, 10) 
To hear is to speak: to tell it to someone else. Fundamental to the method of juxtaposition  (a 
concrete method used to privilege Saying over the Said) described by Simon is the commentary and 
response of all participants. They must write back, speak back, to one another. To an other. Responsibility 
without limit in endless saying: I was exposed to a story and must testify to my own exposure, to how it 
affected me, how it entered and put into question my own narratives. In slightly different circles this is 
called embodiment: after all, even if we exit the theatre of spectacle, we do not have the option of retreating 
to some ‘neutral’ site. So we must “seek some form of activity using (our) immersion in the very objects of 
study.” (RaP, 9). Perhaps the lesson of the worms is not so odd after all. 
Being present in increasing exposure and transparency, and giving our own response to stories, 
may lead to greater realization of our roles as inheritors. Inheritance can only have meaning through being 
received. A gift needs enactment; its originary demand is that one at least accept it. So “the inheritance of 
testament is the reception of the gift of the ghost.” (RaP,14) Of course these gifts are non-reciprocal. The 
“only way to return the gift is by giving it to someone else.” (RaP,14) By teaching. There is the 
pedagogical dimension: there is always only more work, and limitless obligation. 
A responsible teacher will hold the political together with the ethical. In watching a testamentary 
video, for example, she might ask, with Donna Haraway, with whose blood were my eyes crafted? She 
might encourage her students to ask themselves the same question. She will always sober back to 
awareness of her privilege, to the structural dimension and justice. But true hospitality is unconditional, 
prior to any politics, which returns us to the aporia at hand. So it is very fortunate indeed that arts practices 
– by sidestepping rationality – invite simultaneously existing polarities into the discourse. 
Finally, when such a teacher tells you of another’s telling, out of a commitment to the preservation of true 
alterity, she must negotiate her own astonishment and heartbreak. And she must be vigilant against making 
a spectacle of it, which is very difficult. Because there is that moment of astonishment. Being alive inside 
and exposed to a story will always make certain of it.  
 Oh, I go crazy with all this flickering! I come here to describe but I can describe only in part, and 
only part of me can describe it, what a rabbit has to do with justice. Part of me tears at my own tongue in 
weeping silence knowing that these words are so much vanity in the face of this emergency. 
Then the ghosts that haunt interrupt my self-pity and their injunction backs me up against a wall that reads 
(and its graffiti is done by the only people I have ever trusted) that reads Art is The Only Shelter you have 
ever known, could ever know. 
So I re-commit to art in Good Faith – ethically, politically – and I let fly, let my pen fly, let my 
lips move, reaching for the words that speak love, that speak responsibility, that speak despite the hard-won 
understanding that I could also say  
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Fuck Shelter. 
Speechless again, my ego inhales into its endless, insatiable desire to be, silently I breathe out and 
am, my sister’s keeper. 
 
 And right away she forces me to speak; a welcome cannot be silent. True hospitality, as we have 
seen, consists in responding to the story a refugee has just told me. Justice always speaks, even if in the 
form of a koan: I must offer hospitality by opening the home I DO have to the humility of the other, and 
opening the home I do NOT have to the height of the other. Part of hospitali ty is this “difficult, ambivalent 
relation to place. As though the place in question in hospitality were a place originally belonging to neither 
host nor guest, but to the gesture by which one of them welcomes the other – even and above all if he is 
himself without a dwelling from which this welcome could be conceived.” (OH, 62)10   
And yet – because my privilege has afforded me at least an empirical home – I dwell and then I 
welcome. “To make a home is to establish identity with a primordial grasp, yes; but it is also, in some 
measure, to give it away with an extended palm.” (McKay, 23) Again, not a paradox but a flicker between 
two realities; the remainder not expressible by either vocabulary cannot be named. But the remainder 
endures.  
 Don McKay, quoted above, takes Levinas with him into the wilderness to help him write nature 
poetry. The undecidability at the centre of hospitality is enacted precisely in the wilderness, where the 
artificial and provisional nature of nomination and what escapes reference is just as palpable as with 
biographical narrative. 
As anyone who wishes to avoid fetishizing trauma and injury must be, McKay is careful to 
distinguish poetic attention from romantic inspiration (T, 27) By the latter, attention is structured much as it 
is in the phantasmagoria; perception is translated into language with no break, no lapse, no doubt. Our 
familiar aporia operates in the wilderness in a way shockingly resonant with the theme of hospitality. Mc 
Kay describes the situation of nature poetry as “analogous to home-making. Being language, it cannot 
avoid the primordial grasp, but this occurs simultaneously with the extended palm, the openness in 
knowing that I’ve been calling poetic attention.” (T, 29) 
 Nature poetry offers further echoes of and parallels with concepts central to an ethical 
reconsideration of arts practices with refugees. Recall that artistic activities can invite cognitive and 
affective unblocking through mechanisms that sidestep reason, and admit paradox (and any wild 
abstraction imaginable) into expression. McKay puts it thus: “ Poets are supremely interested in what 
language can’t do; in order to gesture outside, they use language in a way that flirts with its destruction.” 
(T, 32) 
 This is good, insofar as language translates and transforms the invisible into the visible; said 
destruction limits the capacity of language to generate system and totalizing intelligibility. This happy truth 
about poetry is a gift given to all who work with it. 
 But all this is not a case against speaking, it is a call to develop more just ways of using language. 
More than it can’t, it must be the place of exchange of biographical stories, the site of contiguity between 
our memories. Clearly, the current meditation is concerned with the ethical orientation of the listener in 
proximity. Characteristically in harmony with Heidegger, McKay describes poetic listening as enacted both 
with and beyond language. “And when poetry does become speech, it returns to the business of naming 
with this listening folded inside it.” (T, 66) 
 There is a certain aching joy in holding the understanding that the words sea otter indicate but fail 
to contain the same unnamable creature (and, in a sense, have contributed to its destruction). Yet if the love 
poem to a sea otter is  an invocation as well, then it transcends all we have said about language, and justice 
flows from the ethical relation to the page or the lips. “The ‘o’ which sometimes precedes apostrophe, and 
is always implicit in the gesture, might be described as the gawk of unknowing... It says ‘this is for you, not 
just about you’.” (T, 66)  
 Yet and still, it is silence that precedes and surrounds these feelings of tenderness, if silence is the 
duration of undecidability. McKay relates the following myth: 
“Among the Haida, the canoe people are spirit beings who travel perpetually among the islands, 
appearing ashore whenever a shaman opens the way. Before this first occurred they did not realize they 
were spirits or who they were.” (T, 77) In his love poem, he celebrates these people who are 
                                                
10 This passage, written by Anne Dufourmantelle, is found in her commentary on Of Hospitality.  
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“maundering their wayless way/ among the islands, and now even/ into English with its one-thing-
then/ another-traffic-signalled syntax: out there, never/ having heard their keel’s bone-crunch on the 
beach, the terrible/ birth cry of the plot.” (T, 78) 
And so to refugees, honouring me with every syllable with which they share some of the truth 
about who they are, could I learn to send... smoke signals? Something to show I am hearing their song 
echoing across the lake, that they are my sunshine, my only sunshine, and everything besides. That they 
recede in darkness too, before they land, before the story has breath to begin. Do you remember that Lord 
Krishna is blue because he is holding his breath? And now you know why. 
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BEFORE THE BIRTH OF THE PLOT: 
 
HERE         I         WAS         BEFORE         YOU         NOW 
 
 
 
 
 
But over the hands that have touched things, 
 
 
 
places trampled by beings, 
 
 
 
the things they have held, the images of those things, 
 
 
 
the fragments of those things, the contexts in which those fragments enter, 
 
 
 
the inflexions of the voice and the words that are articulated in them, 
 
 
 
the ever sensible signs of language, the letters traced, 
 
 
 
the vestiges, the relics – over all things, 
 
 
 
beginning with the human face and skin, 
 
 
 
tenderness spreads. 
 
 
 
Language and Proximity 
Emmanuel Levinas 
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The relations which I perceive between things – and these often include causal and historical 
relations – tend to form in my mind a complex synchronic pattern. I see fields where others see chapters. 
And so I am forced to use another method to try to place and define events. A method which searches for 
co-ordinates extensively in space, rather than consequentially in time. I write in the spirit of a 
geometrician. One of the ways in which I establish co-ordinates extensively is by likening aspect with 
aspect, by way of metaphor. I do not wish to become a prisoner of the nominal, believing that things are 
what I name them.  
         John Berger 
 
Before I am stunned into silence, I draw in one more breath. Breath to tell you what has shocked 
me. A field of words that is not a story; a stunning landscape. I will die from holding my breath, figuring 
out the exact words worthy of your ears. I love you so much. Can you feel my rabbit-breath on your face? 
Closer, now. Concentrate. 
 
Come in. It was at its peak when I was about twelve. I would love to re-arrange my bedroom and 
do it just so and set up little objects d’art and strategically draw the eye’s attention to the spines of certain 
books and not others. At this time my three George Orwell novels were positively fanned out by my bed. 
My mother had given me one whole wall of my room to graffiti with marker and spraypaint, which my rapt 
friends always had a go at, hesitant at first and then god, that feeling I got when I said, No, go for it, it’s 
cool. 
 
Not much has changed. Ever the host. I want you to come in. I want to serve you. No, I want to 
show off. No, I just do not want to be alone in here. And I cannot leave. You’re always late. Hurry. (It is in 
the very same strange voice that I have been courting my own life all this time. And I’m far, far later even 
than you are.) 
 
 
 
I want to tell you about how I spend most of my time. Here in my own city, I work with refugees 
from all over the place. Mainly, I do things with them that have to do with art, with dramatic or literary 
activities that draw on life stories. Because of that, I am very interested in research and thinking around 
autobiography, testimony and witnessing. But ethics... I love ethics. This little story is an attempt to tell the 
truth about why I do what I do, and why I love what I love. It is also a warning: Watch out! The day your 
life feels a bit wooden, it may catch fire just then... 
 
My relationships with refugees, both individual ones and the conceptual category, are complex. 
They lack the consistency and coherence people tend to attribute to them in discussions of ‘assistance’ or 
‘power’. These relationships also change through time, as I and the refugees in my life all take turns being 
grouchy, needy, busy and everything else. It is safe to say, however, that I do not ‘identify’ with refugees 
due to any kind of ‘common experience’. Such a claim would make a mockery of the gravity of their 
experiences and mine, which is exactly the gravity that gives weight to language. That attracts it to the 
earth, and holds it there.  
 
It would, however, be an equally serious travesty to suggest that my biography and my choices, 
my body and my luck, did not lead to my interest in the theme of exile. My devotion to refugees could not 
be an accident, randomly drawn from a hat labeled: well you have to do something. Could it. It had to have 
started a very long time ago. 
 
 
 
I am walking behind my mother, slow and bored, at the Kitchener Farmer’s Market. I don’t know 
how old I am, but I had not yet passed through the door that marks the moment when little girls start to 
listen – or at least, to posture as such, with focused eyes and still faces – to listen unsquirming to the 
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conversations of grownup women rather than fidgeting away the dragging moments until their mothers are 
done.  
 
I am walking and daydreaming, short before the round stained glass window high up at the top of 
the escalator. We are going up and I smell sausages. And I am dreaming of golden light and the Prince of 
Peace. But it’s not Jesus, it’s earthly, either in the faraway past or future of this world; he’s a Good King at 
the pinnacle of a simple hierarchy. He is a he, and he’s wise and kind; I fit into his world perfectly, his 
mercy a perfectly round bubble. 
 
Irritation arrests me. I feel a strange and nagging... transparent... barrier? As if this golden world 
with its white castle were in one of those glass balls and would shatter if... I am losing words to describe 
this feeling, like cringing. Inside the ball it’s too static, like it’s dead. I don’t know. I want an Oktoberfest 
sausage before we go, I also want a cinnamon bun. I am so hungry.    
 
 
 
My hunger and all the hunger surrounding me. It sucked and pulled my life in a great many, 
sometimes worrying directions. A source of sorrow in my life is how unable I was (and remain) to explain 
these paths to my mother. The principal difficulty is in overcoming the sensation of not being trusted or 
believed by her, she who hates a liar more than anything. Don’t get me wrong; of course I would sometimes 
lie to her, emphatically, indignantly. But the truth is often much harder to explain, more neurotic, more 
shadowy, and at times can uncannily feel like a lie. 
 
What could I say, for example, when my mother asked where the hundred-dollar down duvet had 
gotten to? It was somewhere out there in Kitchener, in a basement, in this bitterly cold January, and it was 
wrapping up an old man named Mohammed. He had told me he didn’t have a blanket, that he was using a 
towel, and, instead of killing myself, I had taken him to my apartment and given him the duvet that my 
mother really could not afford but had bought for me anyhow, for special. Yes I did appreciate it but some 
people leave me with no choices, in a state where nothing can override what I know I must do. 
 
On the other hand, those moments I am able to do nothing whatsoever become burnt more 
severely into my mind, as haunting images, as convictions that sentence me to doing something more 
extreme next time I am able. Before I became accustomed to this set of feelings, when I was young, I 
would be driven mad. Hearing through the ceiling or across the field parents screaming at children, and 
their cries, and the dreaded thumping or crashing of someone being beat would literally have me writhing 
around on my bed, clutching my chest, like a little piece of bacon, popping, screaming into my pillow. It 
was unbearable. There is not one syllable of exaggeration in this paragraph. 
 
On the other hand, perhaps I am not yet quite accustomed to this set of feelings. 
Because the ladies still kill me. The legless lady pushing herself through the sand on a Frisbee in Vietnam. 
The lady in a market in Morocco, shuffling along blankly in the blaring sunshine with the word lucky 
printed on each plastic sandal. The shy and eager old Japanese ladies, the hopeful housewives in my classes 
when I taught there, coming to class with brand new pencil cases with dogs or bunnies printed on them, the 
earnest way these ladies lay their cases and notebooks out, neatly and symmetrically in front of them, and 
looked at me. I had to leave a classroom at the top of the hour once, from welling up.  
 
And the lady who made such warm, non-crazy eye contact with me on the St. George subway 
platform and moved towards me. I think she is coming to tell me the Ancestral Secret of the Wise Old 
Ladies. She stops just in front of me, and reaches down… Into a trashcan right there I hadn’t noticed… 
Pulls up a crumpled McDonald’s bag. Opens it, and out comes a Big Mac box, opens it. Eats the nine 
greasy, shiny little fries rattling around in it. Hungry Granny, I swear before God, for you I almost jumped 
in front of the westbound train as it arrived, a moment later. 
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Their galactic well of pain is deeper than any thought, and I am the rabbit and the stupid sitting 
duck. Forever hypnotized by my vertigo, by my impotence to make things right for them, by the absurdity 
of the useless sacrifice I offer and offer. A parody of Oskar Schindler at the end, realizing what more he 
could have done, and, rending his clothes (as it were), choking on tears; he is delirious with shame. He 
beholds the possessions he still has  and could have given, and shaking, sputtering, This watch, this suit... I 
must somehow divest myself of the glory of this body, this life ... before the end, and there is such a thing as 
too late. 
 
 
 
Come in. Now, as an adult: different books on exhibit! And now in my home I am free to let you 
stay, to help you and feed you. And we will make this place my home together. You will make this place 
my home by coming? Could it be that simple? 
 
I enter my house, lock the door, and go into the bathroom. And if I position the two mirrors above 
my sink just so, I cannot see myself at all, though I’m standing right in front of them. And it’s good. Lean a 
bit to peek out an ear, jump back to the invisible middle, grinning. A ghost host! 
 
 
 
Exile is never the state of being satisfied, placid, or secure. Exile, in the words of Wallace Stevens, 
is “a mind of winter” in which the pathos of summer and autumn as much as the potential of spring are 
nearby but unobtainable... Exile is life led outside habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal; 
but no sooner does one get accustomed to it than its unsettling force erupts anew.  
        Edward Said  
 
 I am so little and I’m standing in Victoria Park in Kitchener. My father is behind me. I behold – 
the first time I had the feeling, “behold”, rather than “see” – the swans on the wee lake, the group of trees, 
shimmering, switching in the soft breeze.  
My father is low, perhaps crouching, and I will never forget – in his English accent ground up by 
cigarettes – he said: 
“There are two worlds. The phenomenal and the noumenal. Can you see them?” 
 
I nodded. 
I could. 
 
Throughout the intervening twenty-five years, since that day in the park, I have struggled to find a 
way of life – though I’d be overjoyed to find a single action – that is valid in both of these worlds. Most of 
what I believe politically can safely be called ‘Marxist’, which does leave room for the invisible world. But 
most of what I believe about that invisible world has to do with God.  
 
Yet the impulse to classify seems to indicate an inferior way of thinking, as a one-second flirt with 
the label ‘Christian Marxist’ just taught me. Hold still: inferior? What is doing this judging? This relentless 
drawing of an ever-widening Big Picture? I love the sensations that attend certainty to the point where I 
cram reality into themes to experience confirmation. Of all my theories, pet and thunderous.   
 
Here is one instruction given to me by God: Find ways of speaking that indicate one is ready to let 
go of the labels – ways of signaling to one another that one is trying to put words aside, or at least, put them 
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in brackets. For purely political reasons (see: Sad History of Rationality, Vols. 1 – 2003), it is a good idea 
to name all that is at work underneath nomination, but in such a way that brings to mind what has forever 
escaped it and will forever continue to do so. This project requires one to use and refer to words. What is 
this, a joke? 
 
Punchline: my father was a philosophy teacher. Logic, actually. But he limited his domain to 
everything that happened before Heidegger told him that being beings and nothing nothings, whereupon he 
said Bah humbug , and retreated to ancient Greece, where he retired. Plato had the last word; no one else 
need speak. 
 
So he is not my interlocutor 
He is not my interlocutor 
 
That would be a pathologization, or at least a psychoanalytic turn, in the answer to the question 
who are you?  
 
YOU: This one who sounds infantile and petulant, insisting like a shifty-eyed criminal, that 
childhood is resolved, and over. Yes and no, dear, yes and no: the truth lies somewhere in between, in a 
gray zone. If John Berger sees fields where others see chapters, I see filigree rather than links in a causal 
chain; I stand under the mistletoe and God plants a yes and a no: one upon each cheek, flushed and wet 
with tears, re -telling the nicest memory I have of my dad, over and over, to whoever will listen. 
Whomever. 
 
 
 
My dreams are made of trains and elevators, and phrases, the meaning of which often escape me, 
but their significance is felt as so weighty that they startle me awake. Just before dawn, spoken loudly in 
my own voice: You are SO MUCH MORE than the nexus between what the world throws and you, and 
what it demands of you. Whoa! Okay! I’m awake! But the phrases are not always so pithy and sweet, and 
this much is true: in dreams begin responsibilities. 
  
 In a recent dream I carried a delicious sandwich, carefully wrapped, in my right hand. There was a 
hungry woman on a high unicycle approaching, passing... Yes, it was more certain that she was hungry 
than anything else in the dream, and I wanted to help, to feed her, to offer her, of course, the triple -decker 
work of art in my hand. I stretched, extending my arm skyward with all my energy. Obviously grateful, she 
reaches down and grasps the food, reaches down and I let go of it, reaches down just enough to destabilize 
her centre of gravity. Over-compensating, losing her balance, top-heavy and in slow motion, falling away 
from me. Sandwich clutched, she fell to her death. The thud of her body on the ground triggered in me a 
nausea so strong that it woke me. 
 
 
 
Back to sunshine, walking in peace. Most definitely awake now, but I do not ‘get it’. God made 
the world and I do not understand any more than I can imagine ‘claiming’ this or any land. I’m truly in the 
middle of nowhere, on an island in the St. Lawrence waterway. The only sign of animal life here is a group 
of cows, sleeping small in the distance. What kind of lunatic claims a piece of land as their own, and names 
it?  
 
A car passes and I and the driver both wave so automatically, with such soft wrists and elbows, 
exchange a smiling glace. As if to say I walk here, answered softly with, And I drive. It’s so mundane and 
beautiful, it’s the After you, sir at the elevator door. So I pause, and think, unblinking. 
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I stand still for a while, looking down... Inviting a little bug (of a kind I’ve never seen before!) to 
walk on my ankle. He accepts. And I imagine that he smiles. And I think that if death is a state of no 
memory, and if I am only flesh, only incarnated for one lifetime after all, then that too, surely that is part of 
God’s dream for this world.  
 
Intersubjectivity is not a relation of mastery , we hear. But it’s still more: all relations of mastery 
are hallucinations, distortions of the original relation which every other relation presupposes. Such 
delusions are only possible derivatively, like the way certain drugs visually distort what is manifest. The 
original relation – the ethical relation – is  way behind and within the structure of me/now/bug and sunshine. 
Having created me, having crafted the eyes that see the bug, it is patiently breathing under all that is. Call it 
whatever you like, explain it as exhaustively as you might, nothing mediates it. Nothing.  
 
Somehow that thought causes me to walk on.   
 
As I walk I recall a game that all North American children play (oh, the research is out there...). I 
remember playing it, how everyone knew it. One child holds up a (straw, grass, wheat) and asks the other, 
Is this a tree or a bush?  It’s a one word answer, Tree or Bush , as the case may be. After receiving the 
answer, the smarty-pants interlocutor decides: she either leaves the straw in its current state and says That’s 
right, it’s a tree! or, as the case may be, she pushes the fluffy little seeds up to the top of the straw to form a 
bunch held tight between her thumb and fingertip, smiling, Yep, it’s a bush. She can also say No I’m sorry, 
it’s a tree/bush , leaving it be or pushing the seeds up as the case may be. The only point of the game is the 
script. 
 
After a few rounds of this, inevitably the guesser wants a turn, Let me now, it’s my go. Because of 
that sweet taste: to be the one who decides, who confirms or denies, to say what the case is and to make it 
match that full, round intention, complete adequacy to intuition, inside fulfilled outside, mirroring my 
decision, no surprises. And I stop in my tracks: surely all the little girls of North America are not evil. 
Drawing themes and designating names is simply part of what we do, part of human life on earth, and the 
brains of even little girls love it.  
 
It is not an error to call this light ‘sunshine’. Error begins when I think I have fully succeeded in 
naming it. Error begins when I claim my place in it, when I name that place ‘mine’. 
 
 
 
Exile... is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self 
and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted. And while it true that literature and 
history contain heroic, romantic, glorious, even triumphant episodes in an exile’s life, these are no more 
than efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of estrangement. The achievements of exile are 
permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever.  
        Edward Said  
 
 It is said that people’s names do not properly belong to language. And it’s true that I often feel as 
though I am conjuring him away, erasing him, inviting the reader to miss the point, when I write the name: 
Ed Halbach. My guide, my mentor, my teacher; he instructed me on everything: space aliens, American 
foreign policy, sinister conspiracies, Buckminster Fuller, Gurdjieff… When I was lost in my mind he made 
me look at a pinecone, and told me its secret, which I can't tell you. His steaming kitchen, wooden table, 
smelling of coffee with his wild wild garden outside, with turtles and compost heap. His running for mayor 
and his loving of insects: he called me Junebug.  
  
Ed and I argued often and he was relentless, insisting on my responsibility to transform my life, to 
disappear, to wake up, and to awaken the guides inside me. He made me meditate outside all night to figure 
out what is meant by 'disappear'. Okay, he never once made me do anything. He and his wife and sons went 
to a real pow-wow, and they took me with. I fell asleep by the fire, transported by love. 
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In one way or another, he helped me with every problem I ever had from the age of fourteen 
(retrospectively, I am awed by his patience and wonder what on earth kept him interested).  Now, this – his 
death – was the most serious problem I had ever had. And he was no help at all. I was twenty-three years 
old, but my perceptions and attitudes were so bound up in him that I was anchorless imagining life without 
him.  
 
 I went to see him all the time while he was sick. Mesothelioma sounded like a dinosaur's name. He 
was a very tall man. Now, he looked so small, shrinking, with his knees under a blanket in his living room. 
He had moved out of the house with the turtles in the backyard, and I always imagined them trying to 
follow him to the new house. I would picture them waiting patiently to cross King Street, with their houses 
packed up and loaded on to their backs.  
 
He and I talked at length about why he was not doing the work to make himself better. He did not 
believe in death's inevitability; he considered it a choice. So why are you dying asshole. He said it was work 
he wasn't prepared to do. The story there is absolutely literal, and I’ll tell it to you another time. He was 
only sick for nine months and he was only forty-five or something. 
 
The last day I saw him, I accidentally stood on his oxygen tube and we laughed. He had set up a 
room off the kitchen on the ground floor. We talked slowly, laboriously, for quite a while. He asked me to 
take care of the insects for him, told me some chores to do in the backyard, explained how he should have 
been putting down peat moss that week. He told me he loved me and I told him it back and kissed his 
forehead. Right before I left he earnestly asked me to play 'Paper Scissors Rock' with him. Okay, Morphine 
Man. I was standing and he was sitting and the sun was setting. He won. "Paper covers rock," was the last 
thing he said to me as his hand clasped around my closed fist. He fell instantly and soundly asleep and I 
peeled his hand off my fist and left quietly. It would be years before I was myself again. 
 
I’m sorry, Ed; I think I just kind of used you. I’m telling my story, so I talked about you, but I sort 
of put violins at the end. 
 
Well, yes, I guess I heard them at the time, too. 
 
Good Lord, it takes such a very long time to say something true about oneself. 
 
 
 
The writer’s desire to finish is fatal to the truth. The End unifies. Unity must be established in 
another way. 
         John Berger 
 
I am intensely grateful for language. My life has left me without doubt that writing is doing 
something, that words change people and things. What we do with language is important and real; its 
effects can be evolutionary or instantaneous. The novels of Cormac McCarthy ended my childhood forever. 
A passage in an essay written by my philosophy teacher stopped me from throwing a cigarette butt off my 
porch.   
 
Another scene from the porch: I was with my friend Anne, wobbly after a long night of 
indulgence. My mouth was dry, and I was confused over the porch light; it kept coming on every time I 
moved! Going off when I was still! After I gained intellectual mastery over that phenomenon, I wriggled 
my foot to keep it on as I read the following aloud to her:     
 
The elevator door opens 
unexpectedly on the third floor 
and you get in  
then both of you glide shut 
[big silence] 
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Some days I feel like I have nothing to look forward to. 
 
UN investigators have confirmed reports of human rights 
violations committed by rebel troops during recent fighting in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, including rape, torture, 
arbitrary executions and cannibalism. The UN mission in DRC says 
soldiers from the Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of 
Congo and two smaller factions were responsible for the 
atrocities which took place between mid-October and the end of 
December in North-eastern Congo. 
 
The book I’m reading talks about “how to engage with that on 
unphantasmagoric terms”. I take that book everywhere. I want to 
be good. But. 
Some days I recoil from every inch of the known universe, such 
that I end up quite compressed. On those days I sit on a chair at 
my house, shaking like a leaf, reading about power in my book. 
By nightfall, I get up, to go buy cigarettes, and start writing 
in my head. I walk my way into thunderous silences and write my 
way to peace by the end of the block.  
McCaul meets Queen and I have words that could save the world, 
re-constitute subjectivity… I sew reality right up into the 
limits of my skin and let it go again, as I walk South. I reach 
the store sane by the grace of the English language alone. 
So I’m giving you the chance here, to talk to a Real Live Poet. 
 
Hey, Person – you with the face – 
Now is not the time, I guess, and this is not the place 
But since we seem to be going to the millionth floor 
 
I just wanted to tell you that you’re in the clear 
and I thought you’d want to know 
that my contempt for you has finally run out 
I don’t think you understand how angry I was 
about the decline of the sea otter population 
The beautiful saints of the sea shriveling up for oil 
I beat my chest and bit my nails for almost two years 
I had a nightmare of the bad infinity; it just went on and on 
But I learned one thing during that time and that’s 
All hatred is self-hatred 
Cause I was speechless when Katie asked me about  
The tar in my own shriveling lungs 
Katie always knows what’s going on with me 
So if I can forgive you for driving an SUV, 
For all the rest, can you ever forgive me? 
 
More than 350 witnesses and victims interviewed by the UN rights 
investigators confirmed…allegations that rebels from the MLC had 
committed widespread human rights violations during their recent 
advance on the town of Beni. In one case, investigators heard how 
a young girl was cut into small pieces by the soldiers and then 
eaten. In others, how hearts and organs were cut out of victims 
and forced on their families to eat. 
 
So a citizen goes up to a poet and says, 
“Can you describe this?”  
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In the electric space between the Yes and the No 
This is where I have chosen to stay. 
This space is my home. 
Because, my friend, I do not remember 
The days before we began to make ghosts out of one another. 
I take it on faith, and I’m only a student,  
poring over the hagiography of the blind saints who crowded the 
horizons before the beginning of time. They gathered together in 
the dark and if there had been any light, we’d have been able to 
see their breath as they discussed the making of the world. 
And when they set it all in motion, it was not light, but 
language. 
It was the alphabet that crashed in, to the nothingness. 
Each letter demanded the world, and called it into being. 
 
Since then, all that has ever mattered to me is you.  
Of course you don’t remember why, that’s okay. Neither do I. 
But that’s not enough to make me stop 
this pacing back and forth 
in front of the gates that guard this moment from 
the rest of time.  
 
After a brimming quiet moment, she did not tell me it was good. She did, however, say Wow, 
that’s a lot of responsibility. It was intensely gratifying to have how I actually experience writing reflected 
back to me in her words. Because it does feel as serious as all that. But the martyr image has never fit; for 
one thing, I would dearly love to think it’s just not my style, and for another I am too blessed. In one 
respect I have never had to carry any burden totally on my own; I have had a great deal of luck, and a great 
deal of help: 
  
Ed came back to me finally. In a dream. It did not feel like a normal dream. It felt like  a visitation.  
 
I was lying in my childhood bed, winter frost on the window. Made with hot breath and gentle, 
circular rubbing, two circles of clear window appeared, each with a cat's face in it. Of course, I thought, the 
cats of death.  
 
The harbingers then disappeared and Ed climbed over the sill into my room. He took me up and 
we slow danced around my room. I could hear his thoughts: he knew he was dead, he knew how I'd missed 
him, how much I'd been thinking of him. Then he asked, Do you want to see where I live? 
 
Of course I do. 
 
We ran outside - it was suddenly a bright summer day – to the crest of a hill, with decadent people 
under umbrellas, sipping around the matching miniature umbrellas in their cocktails. Death was a resort! 
 
Ed started running down the hill, leapt up and took off flying! I hung back, saying I can't... But I 
wanted so fiercely to follow, so I started flying. It's so easy...it's so easy! 
We flew over this terribly strange landscape that alternated sunny apple orchards and deep dark abysses, in 
undulating turns. Orchard, abyss, orchard, abyss. Finally he landed and stood on the ground near an apple 
tree. I landed in front of him and I knew that I had a very short time left there. I was going to fade away. I 
knew I had time to ask only one question, and I was wracking my brain but I couldn't think of a question 
that seemed important enough. So I finally, at the last second, asked, Will I ever see you again?  
 
He began to morph, his face to melt, into all these people who were peripheral to my life at that 
time: the vegetable man at the IGA, the cafeteria lady at school, that stage manager guy at school who I 
always nodded at but didn't talk to, my upstairs neighbour. 
Then he was gone, and I awoke. No one ever answers my questions as unequ ivocally as he used to.   
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Exile dispatch: Japan 
 
 Exile is loss, but not in-the-middle-of-loss. It is a territory after loss. There is a quiet centripetal 
force; yes, it’s empty but it’s not bad. It is where everything that happens, happens and all that is, is. Here 
there is only one story that has ever been told, can ever be told. Each molecule is so... acute, and precisely 
what is possible: no more nor less that what is actual, nothing impossible ever happens. 
 
 Atashi no tomodachi wa jisatsu suru. Is Japanese for My friend committed suicide. Back home, in 
Canada, yes. No, there’s no use in my going home, I know. Sorry, excuse me... I don’t think my 
understanding of your question is good. Kanojo wa hazukashi ja nai. Shiranai. I said these things over and 
over, in March and in June, on behalf of two different friends. I forget the translation for She killed her 
baby daughter first.  
 
 They were traumatic months. In Japan each little neighbourhood has a public bath, glowing from 
the inside and smelling like flowers; steaming away late into the night, like an engine recharging the 
women. I began to go every day. After a long while, the old women stopped poking my belly, pulling on 
my piercings and rubbing my tattoos. It helped when I learned the Japanese for I feel rather like a bear in 
the circus at this time. Which sent us all into fits of laughter.   
 
 I understand that suicides do not await my forgiveness any more than God awaits my approval. 
 
Exile dispatch: Prague  
 
 Muj kamarad si sebevrazdil. That’s  the Czech, which I learned a few years later. Every time 
someone died, I became extremely promiscuous for a few weeks. I will never forget some of those brave 
and interesting strangers with whom I shared a very bizarre intimacy.  
 
While in Prague, I dreamt that I dreamt the history of the world as written in a big book by an 
Indian Chief, and my mum didn’t believe me. When I opened the book to prove it to her, it was the Prague 
phone book. Then my mum turned to me and told me she thought heaven was very far away. 
 
Exile dispatch: Manitoba 
So I was at a bar very late at night and I bummed a few cigarettes off these three Palestinian guys 
because I missed the store. Around closing time they came back and asked for my help dealing with this 
really wasted prostitute harassing them at their table. So I went over with my friend and sat down and this 
blond woman with a hectic miniskirt and that sickly sweet milky vomit breath started hitting my leg and 
asking if I wanted to hear some poetry. Said she knew I was all booksmart and all that but had I ever heard 
this? No I hadn’t, she continued, because it was alloriginal . After the first slurred poem about the nature of 
love, she made a second offering. 
 It took me only a second to figure it out, to see it. Recognition gave way to weightlessness. The 
poem relentlessly conjured up places, one place, that place where the gravel road meets the paved road in 
front of Willie’s. In the poem someone writes indian in the dust on the back of a car. In it someone kicks 
their dog and will not feed it and calls it mutt and falls, sighing, confessing that it is not the only mutt in the 
house. Is it. 
 I lock in. Where are you from? I ask in a clandestine tone, and she understands my understanding 
immediately. She reminds me of Eve, suddenly naked, as she says, Central Manitoba – you wouldn’t know 
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it. My head floods with words but all I say is Try me. After some prodding she names a reservation near 
Moosehorn. I tell her my mother’s family lives just outside a reservation at Dog Creek. By now we are 
shouting, elated, grabbing hands... Rosalie asks for my family’s name. Spence. 
 She wells up: Oh, Spence, Spence from Dog Creek! Norman Spence took my virginity; He was my 
one true love; Broke my heart; That’s why I’m like this; I’ll never forget; O You Spence! (Now, I did say 
outside the reservation, didn’t I?) Do you know Norman? His mum’s name’s Rosalie, just like mine. Big 
guy with freckles?  
 Now the crazy part is that years ago I went to a bar in Moosehorn and met a bunch of Indian guys 
who claimed to know who I was: I was Granny's granddaughter. They told me they were related to me. The 
next morning I told my granny what these boys had said in the bar, and of course she said those boys were 
making things up; nothing new here. But! One of them was a fat guy with freckles named Spence, and all 
this I told Rosalie. 
 
 She was too wasted to hear the silence in my story, to see the gaping hole. Good thing – otherwise 
I would have had to ask her to believe the utter science fiction I have been as ked to believe all my life: Our 
family just happens to live very close to a reservation, in the middle of absolutely nowhere. Though my 
grandfather looked like a brown Asian man and spoke a language other than English, though about half of 
his children look brown too (‘Suntans from being out on the tractor all day’ was what my mother actually 
said to me when I was little), though some of my first cousin have status cards, though the name Spence is 
dominant on that reservation , though... everything, still, we are white. ‘Just plain old regular Canadians’. 
Because Indians are drunk and dirty and can’t take care of things. Their dogs are scary, their beaches are 
dangerous, their cars are dusty. 
 
 Oh my earth, and my place upon it... My Rosalie. I tried to take her home, to feed her, to take care 
of her. Come on girl – what are you doing? At least take my number and address. When I turned to fetch a 
pen to write them down, she took off. She was incredibly fast. I ran out onto Spadina, searching for her. 
 
 My white body is still walking through the amazingly dark and endless night. 
 
Exile dispatch: Cambodia 
 
I am here then, I am with you 
I have dreamt of you forever, 
now I’m here. Pressing my forehead 
against yours staring into your eyes. 
DO YOU LOVE ME BACK? 
 
The world is the size of a postage stamp, 
and most of that is underwater. 
I could lay down and die for every person I see, 
and after these million deaths, 
the dusty expanse of the vast vast landscape  
would still be located  
on my finger tip. 
So I stare and do not stop, 
my finger in the air. 
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Years ago, Ed dreamt that he had a big, important-looking book on his lap. When he opened it to 
the first page, it was blank. He began to flip the pages, curiously at first, then desperately. Each and every 
page of the book was blank! But at the bottom of every single page was written one sentence: 
 
Turn the page, there is no poem. 
 
 Though we discussed the meaning and significance of this for weeks, I don’t think I have to 
explain it to you. Not to you. 
 
 
 
 Come in. You enter me from the inside. I am not one, I am (at least) two. Scattering and melting 
under your gaze, my impulse to give myself to you is reconfigured as thirst and hunger; metaphysical and 
physical desires scramble together. Here I am fearless and never confused, when the surface of your body is 
continuous with every other surface in the universe. 
 
 Only once in a while do I even long to feel at home. Because as my mind heals and my 
consciousness clarifies, as I patiently age, I get more skilled and faster at building makeshift structures; 
little tents for us at the side of the road. Do you remember what I built for you in the desert? In that 
alleyway in Osaka? The word made flesh, in a high-speed train screaming through the Italian countryside. I 
became half a million slaves to build that altar for you. 
 
 It is not myself I will give you. Not the self of mine. Or, if I were you, and believe me I can at this 
moment imagine it as easily as I can turn the palm of my hand upwards or downwards – or if I were you, 
the self of you. If you want to number me part by part I shall be as any other, for nobody has found the 
judge of parts, nobody has found the nipple to judge the breast... But I am not the sum of my parts. See me 
as wholly as your own dear life demands that you see yourself. I have as many hairs on the back of my neck 
as you may have ways of touching me. It is not myself I give you, it is the meeting of the two of us that I 
offer you. What you offer me is the opportunity for me to offer this. I offer it. I offer it. 
          John Berger  
 
 But always sober up from there, again and again, return to chastity. The story of Sodom and 
Gomorrah – abused and dissimulated for millennia now – only had one message to impart: This is no way 
to treat a guest. 
 
 
 
 Bumping along at the back of a sunny streetcar, late but at peace. A mother, her three sons, and the 
middle son’s friend surround me, and somehow include me in their energy, so I am listening and grinning.  
 
 She is teaching the youngest one the concept of multiplication, explaining then running these little 
drills. He can only handle a wee bit of abstraction, then he makes an error, then she smiles and cuddles him 
and explains again. After several rounds of this, the middle son takes a stab at explaining it . Marginal 
success. His skinny Vietnamese friend jumps in to the conversation, making self-deprecating comments 
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about how he failed math and is failing everything and can’t do anything. They all laugh heartily. Moved, I 
become conscious of the fact that I will write this down later. 
 
 The mum challenges them then: how about division? The eldest explains it so well even I flash 
back to the time I still knew the operation. And the skinny friend lights up. Yeah! That’s why there 
can be a remainder! 
 
 At this point, all four of them look at me. The poetry does not escape me, and I smile, and I nod. 
Why yes, there certainly can be. 
 
 
 
 These passages have been sketches of some of the places my devotion to refugees comes from. 
They have also described some of what I have to offer them. I understand very little about either of these 
things, but am certain of this: 
 
 I have never done anything just in my entire life. I have not yet made my first move forward; I 
have yet to say the first word.  
 
 
 
Turn the page. 
